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South Korea participated in the Vietnam War as America’s ally on a tremendous scale 
involving over 300,000 soldiers from 1964-1973. Despite this massive commitment, 
South Korea’s involvement has attracted little scholarly interest or public attention. The 
prevailing explanation in relevant historiography often dismisses South Korea’s role as a 
mercenary exchange taken under U.S. pressure or in pursuit of economic incentives. 
Alternatively, I argue that the South Korean government had a legitimate national interest 
in participating in the Vietnam War in pursuit of political, national defense, and 
economic advancements that were uniquely motivated by concurrent hostilities with 
North Korea. South Korea’s national interests aligned with the U.S. such that they 
willingly and effectively contributed to the Vietnam War. By the war’s end, U.S. and 
South Korean national interests diverged sharply as relations declined, which left South 
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On March 14, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson received an unusual request that 
was “vitally important” to the war effort in Vietnam. South Korean President Park Chung 
Hee requested a special food, one that would cost Washington an estimated $3-4 million 
dollars per year, to be added to the soldiers’ daily rations.1 “I fully understand the desire 
of your men in the field to enjoy familiar rations,” said the President a week later; “That 
is the way it has been with soldiers throughout history.”2 The President directed Secretary 
of Defense Robert McNamara to fulfill the request, and almost a year later, President 
Johnson could report that “the bureaucracy in Washington gave him more hell” about this 
particular request than the entire Vietnam War in the first place. “The VC [Viet Cong] 
would never be able to hold” now that this food was set to arrive in the beginning of 
1968.3 What was this specific ration that was so urgently needed on the battlefield? The 
fermented cabbage staple of Korea, kimchi, now appeared in the daily rations intended 
for the South Korean troops fighting alongside the U.S. 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) participated in the Vietnam War with an enormous 
commitment over the war’s entire duration. The ROK deployed over 50,000 troops. From 
1964-1973 over 300,000 South Koreans cycled through military service in Vietnam along 
 
1 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 14, 1967, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, [hereafter FRUS] Korea 
1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1. 
2 Letter from President Johnson to President Park, Washington, March 23, 1967. FRUS Korea 1964-1968, 
Volume XXIX, Part 1. 
3 Notes on Conversation Between President Johnson and President Pak. Canberra, December 21, 1967, 
FRUS Korea 1964-1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1. 
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with up to 100,000 civilian contractors conducting logistical support.4 Over 4,400 South 
Koreans died serving in Vietnam.5 The ROK’s contribution to Vietnam was the single 
largest military commitment from an allied partner to a foreign U.S. war since World 
War II, exceeding any allied nation’s contribution to the Iraq War or the total NATO 
contribution to the Afghanistan War.6  
Despite the size and scope of the ROK commitment, Americans today have 
largely forgotten that South Korea ever had anything to do with the Vietnam War. 
Indeed, ROK participation has attracted little scholarly interest from American historians. 
In popular memory, no U.S. movie on Vietnam remotely acknowledges South Korea’s 
presence, and U.S. high school textbooks certainly do not mention their role.7 How could 
a military partnership of this size and duration attract so little attention? Perhaps it is not 
surprising that American history has generally omitted the ROK’s role in Vietnam from 
memory. The unpopularity and controversy surrounding Vietnam as America’s first 
wartime defeat left little motivation to highlight foreign allies.  
Yet, a deeper reason for the omission may lay in a misunderstanding of South 
Korea’s uniquely complex motives for joining the war. The “mercenary narrative” in the 
 
4 Kwak Tae Yang, “The Anvil of War: The Legacies of Korean Participation in the Vietnam War,” (PhD 
diss., Harvard University, 2006), iii.  
5 Robert M. Blackburn, Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson’s “More Flags”: The Hiring of Korean, 
Filipino, and Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War (Jefferson: McFarland & Company Inc., 1994), 31, xiii. 
6 The largest partner contribution to the Iraq War was the United Kingdom at 46,000 soldiers. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11107739.  Total NATO contributions to the Afghanistan 
War peaked at around 30,000 non-U.S. soldiers. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-afghanistan/. This 
statement excludes a nation’s military contribution to a war in its own territory (i.e. South Korea’s military 
during the Korean War or South Vietnam’s military during the Vietnam War). 
7 See Chapter 4 and the bibliography for the list of films that support this assertion. For an example of an 




extant scholarship often quickly dismisses the ROK’s contribution. Scholars and 
commentators, past and present, pejoratively characterized the ROK’s participation as 
mercenaries rather than true allies, and moral ambiguity pervades this exchange. The U.S. 
Government (USG) paid the full cost of the ROK’s military deployments, and the 
Republic of Korea’s Government (ROKG) benefitted tremendously from their 
participation. The total payout to the ROK accounted for five billion dollars, up to 8% of 
the ROK’s GDP during the period 1966-1969.8 Many scholars view the exchange as part 
of the asymmetrical relationship of an overbearing, imperial U.S. bending a client state to 
serve its purposes and propping up authoritarian rulers like South Korean President Park 
Chung Hee. Lastly, as the U.S. struggles with rationalizing its own participation in 
Vietnam, the idea of hiring foreign mercenaries to do the U.S.’ bidding only adds to the 
tumultuous memory.  
However, the mercenary narrative is an overly U.S.-centric interpretation, one that 
greatly oversimplifies events. A recent poll by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies found 
that 80% of South Koreans are aware of ROK participation in Vietnam, 57% believed it 
was the right choice, and only 27% believed the soldiers participated as mercenaries.9 
The poll suggests a competing interpretation exists that is more nuanced than the U.S. 
simply purchasing soldiers for hire. The USG paid for the contributions from other 
nations too. So why exactly did the ROK provide such a disproportionately large 
commitment in the first place when other U.S. allies would not? Did the ROK have larger 
geo-political reasoning for fighting in Vietnam? How impactful were the ROK troops to 
 
8 Glenn Baek, “A Perspective on Korea’s Participation in the Vietnam War,” Asan Institute for Policy 
Studies no. 53 (April 2013): 4.  
9 Baek, 2-3. 
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the war effort? What were the after-effects on U.S/ROK relations? Lastly, why does it 
matter if the U.S. does or does not remember the ROK’s role in Vietnam?  
The U.S. presently, through either outright dismissal or perhaps due to the 
prevalence of the mercenary narrative, has misunderstood and underappreciated South 
Korea’s role in the Vietnam War. The ROK did not participate in Vietnam simply as 
mercenaries in response to U.S. pressure. Instead, their primary motive was the pursuit of 
Park’s national vision of “puguk kangbyong” (rich nation, strong army) and surpassing 
North Korea militarily and economically. In response to concurrent North Korean 
aggression, the ROKG had a legitimate national interest in supporting the U.S. war effort. 
USG and ROKG interests aligned such that the ROKG willingly contributed its military 
in what proved to be an effective and capable force above and beyond the political 
tokenism of symbolic, international support.  
To support this assertion, this thesis utilizes a variety of sources. The first two 
chapters begin with a top-down approach where the primary actors under analysis are the 
governments of the two countries (referred to as USG and ROKG). Government, 
diplomatic, and military institutional sources reveal the USG and ROKG national 
interests, defined as the government’s geo-political motivations for the Vietnam War. 
The USG’s interests in acquiring ROK military personnel were aimed at alleviating acute 
manpower shortages and gaining international approval. The ROKG’s national interests 
were rooted in gaining political stability and surpassing their rival, North Korea. The 
third chapter transitions from the top-down approach to a closer look at the ROK soldiers 
themselves. The ROK’s effective military performance was linked to the ROKG’s 
political aims. The thesis concludes with a comparative analysis of U.S. and South 
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Korean films to analyze public memory of the war. The film analysis shows that despite 
sharing an experience of war together, the question of national interests, “Why are we 
[U.S. and South Korea] in Vietnam?”, is uniquely missing from both country’s popular 
films, and is a possible explanation for why American popular memory does not include 
Koreans in their Vietnam War story. 
Why does it matter if Americans remember South Korea’s role in Vietnam? 
Restoring this memory as a part of American history is important in honoring the 
sacrifice of veterans for its own sake in addition to acknowledging the domestic impacts, 
both good and bad, the war brought to South Korea. South Korean veterans fought and 
died fighting for the same cause as American veterans, and their legacy should bear 
significance on the enduring U.S./ROK partnership. Secondly, the Vietnam War had 
dramatic and lasting effects for the ROK. The economic boost transformed South Korea 
from a poor nation dependent on U.S. aid into the rising world economic powerhouse that 
it is today. However, this transformation also paired with an authoritarian and militaristic 
government that stifled democracy, ignored human rights, and ran roughshod over 
domestic dissent. The USG may not have been fully cognizant of their role in enabling 
the massive transformation and upheaval that followed the ROK’s wartime participation. 
Lastly, the ROK’s participation serves as a case study in understanding the importance of 
a country’s national interest as a determinant in their level of effort towards an alliance. 
The ROK military was most effective in Vietnam when USG and ROKG interests were 




Both academically and in popular memory, South Korea’s role in the Vietnam 
War has been left out of America’s Vietnam War story. A reexamination of the alliance, 
putting South Korea back into the story, will benefit both countries in a wider reflection 
useful for appreciating their veterans and understanding the domestic impacts of the war 
in contemporary South Korea. ROKG’s national interest led them to effectively 
contribute to the Vietnam War. Understanding a country’s national interests, where and 
how they align, and how they change overtime, are vital considerations towards U.S. 
foreign affairs on the world stage. Before turning to my analysis, I will conclude the 
introduction with a brief overview of U.S./South Korean relations following World War 
II and a discussion of the relevant historiography of South Korean participation in the 
Vietnam War.  
 
Historical Background 
 The Vietnam War was part of a long arc of shared history between the U.S. and 
South Korea that began in 1945. The end of World War II liberated Korea from Japanese 
colonial occupation, only to split Korea into two halves at the 38th parallel. A brief period 
of U.S. occupation in the South ended with the ROK’s declaration of independence on 
August 15, 1948. A parallel Soviet occupation resulted in the declaration of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North. Reconciliation attempts 
failed, and the Korean War ravaged the peninsula from June 1950 until the armistice of 
July 1953. The war devastated the country, caused over two and a half million deaths, 
and wiped clean a blank slate for nation building on both sides, North and South.  
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Afterwards, from 1953-1960, the U.S. tepidly supported the ROK’s first 
President, Syngman Rhee, for his anti-communist credentials and western ties. While 
making little progress towards economic development, Syngman Rhee was notoriously 
corrupt and used U.S. financial aid to prop up his unpopular government. In April 1960, a 
student led revolution succeeded in forcing Rhee’s resignation. After Rhee, South Korea 
attempted a brief period of genuine democracy under Chang Myon, which lasted until the 
emergence of the Park Chung Hee coup.10 
Park Chung Hee (1917-1979), more than any other single person, was central to 
South Korea’s involvement in Vietnam. Park grew up poor in Kumi, a small peasant 
village near Taegu. He briefly worked as an elementary school teacher, but his true 
passion was to become a soldier. The militarization readily on display during the 
Japanese colonial period likely influenced Park. He found a mentor in school teacher 
Arikawa Shuichi, a successful Japanese military officer whom Park admired and sought 
to emulate. 11 Following his passion, Park became one of the few Koreans who attended 
the Manchurian Military Academy (at the time in Manchukuo, the Japanese colony) 
where he excelled with a perfectionism that impressed his superiors and peers, earning 
him the nick name “baka-majime” (crazy serious).12 By all contemporary accounts from 
his peers, Park’s experience at the Japanese academy was the most formative of his life, 
and the military discipline and lifestyle shaped his governance that influenced the ROK’s 
 
10 Park Tae Gyun, An Ally and Empire: Two Myths of South-Korea United States Relations, 1945-1980 
(Gyeonggi-do: The Academy of Korean Studies Press, 2012), 129-133, 203-205. 
11 Carter J. Eckert, Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism 1866-1945 (Cambridge 
and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 94-96. 
12 Eckert, 103. 
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path towards increasing militarization.13 Indeed, Park’s military background was 
essential in understanding his inclination towards committing the ROKG to the Vietnam 
War. Following a successful career serving in the Japanese military in World War II and 
the ROK Army (ROKA) in the Korean War, Park rose to the rank of Major General. In 
1961, Park led the coup that ousted the brief democratic government of Chang Myon.  
Park seized power in a military coup against the short-lived democracy of Chang 
Myon in May 1961. Chang went into hiding, and the South Korean President, Yun Po-
Son supported the coup. The USG, who certainly had prior knowledge of the coup, took 
no action to stop it. The USG adopted a “wait and see approach.”14 Park utilized 3,500 
soldiers to carry out a completely bloodless coup. Park’s entrance to the political scene 
was a major turning point in U.S./ROK relations. 
Park led South Korea from 1961-1979 and did more to develop the economy than 
any other executive. During his tenure, South Korea’s economy tripled, overtook that of 
North Korea, and was no longer dependent on U.S. financial aid by 1979.15 All the while, 
he was an authoritarian, military dictator who oppressed political opposition and stifled 
democracy. In hindsight, the cost-benefit analysis of the Park government and its 
methods left a much debated and controversial record for historians. 
The first two years of Park’s government were brutally repressive. Under the 
direction of the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction (SCNR) Park suspended the 
1960 Constitution and began a war on all political dissent. He arrested 2,000 politicians 
 
13 Eckert, 4. 
14 Park, 195. 




(including former Prime Minister Chang Myon), purged 13,300 civil servants, closed 49 
out of the 64 newspapers, arrested 14,000 citizens, and created a “political purification 
law” than banned over 4,000 politicians.16 Repression grew worse after the declaration of 
the Yushin (revitalizing reform) constitution in 1972, when Park declared himself de-
facto president for life, unleashed the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) to 
terrorize the population, and enacted martial law. However, prior to the Yushin order, 
Park, under U.S. pressure, ostensibly ran and presented himself as democratically elected 
President from 1963-1971. This is the primary period under analysis, in which South 
Korea participated in the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. 
Paralleling involvement with postcolonial Korea, the U.S. also became 
increasingly involved in supporting a democratic government in South Vietnam during 
the Cold War. Following World War II, Vietnamese nationalists engaged in a 
postcolonial struggle against the French which culminated in the French defeat at Dien 
Bien Phu in 1954 and caused the division of Vietnam into two countries. The U.S. 
quickly became entangled in support of an unstable South Vietnam in a losing struggle 
against the hostile North and domestic insurgency in the South. Following the 1964 Gulf 
of Tonkin Resolution, the U.S. committed conventional military forces, escalating the 
conflict into the Vietnam War of 1965-1973. The U.S. hoped to bring its allies along for 
the ride to gain international support for the war against communism. 
President Lyndon Johnson and his administration created the “Free World 
Assistance Program,” or colloquially called the “More Flags” program in the spring of 
 
16 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York and London: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2005), 355. 
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1964. “More Flags” sought to legitimize the U.S. effort in the Vietnam War by gaining 
the approval of the international “Free World” community as a global struggle against 
communism. By December 1964, Washington asked thirty-four countries to participate, 
of which only fifteen responded positively. The international community was highly 
resistant to intervention in Vietnam. France, under Charles de Gaulle was particularly 
outspoken and advocated for a neutralization settlement.17 The United Nations and 
majority of the international community agreed with de Gaulle. Of the fifteen countries 
who did respond, six offered to send military personnel (South Korea, The Philippines, 
Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan).18 Washington refused Taiwan’s offer for 
fear of enraging the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and bringing them into the 
conflict.  
South Korea eagerly offered to send combat troops. The ROK commitment far 
and away exceeded all other contributing nations combined by 228% (the next closest 
was Thailand with 11,586 – see Appendix A). From 1964 to 1967, South Korea sent five 
deployments that began with non-combat support and escalated into two combat 
divisions (see Appendix B). Furthermore, the ROK commitment lasted the entirety of the 
war. By 1972, there were more ROK soldiers in Vietnam than U.S. (37,438 ROK to 
29,655 U.S).19 ROK troops finally withdrew after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords 
in 1973. What factors explain this seemingly oversized commitment from the ROK 
compared to the other allies?  How have historians explained these events? 
 
17 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), Chapter 1, Kindle Edition, Location 283-290. 
18 Blackburn, 22. 
19 Eckhardt Fuchs, Tokushi Kasahara, and Sven Saaler eds., A New Modern History of East Asia Vol. 1 




There are two historiographical debates regarding U.S./ROK relations during the 
Vietnam War. The first theme is the mercenary narrative which argues that because the 
U.S. paid for South Korea’s deployments, observers should conclude the ROKG was 
motived solely by economic incentives. Scholars often use the word “mercenary” in a 
broader sense of a loaded term meant to imply criticism of the soldiers’ motivations and 
presence. The second theme considers the consequences the Vietnam War brought to the 
ROK domestically and weighs the extent to which the U.S. bears culpability versus 
Korean agency in causing these effects; essentially, scholars ask “who used who?” In 
other words, to what extent did the U.S. exert pressure to force Korea’s participation, 
versus to what extent did Korean leaders, namely Park Chung Hee, seek out Vietnam as 
an opportunity? Each theme will be analyzed in turn, beginning with the mercenary 
narrative.    
The mercenary narrative reveals a subjectivity that often splits between the 
scholarship of U.S. and South Korean perspectives. Most U.S. scholars favor the 
mercenary narrative in which South Korea, eager to reap the financial benefits, responded 
to U.S. economic incentives and pressure. In contrast, South Korean scholars tend to 
offer more equivocal causality in which ROKG had a legitimate national interest in 
Vietnam and sought political leverage and national security, with economic benefits as 
secondary.  
Beginning with U.S. scholars, Robert M. Blackburn was the first historian to 
devote a monograph addressing the U.S.’ use of allies in the Vietnam War. Blackburn 
decries the “More Flags” initiative as a failure that did not achieve its goal of attaining 
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international approval for the war, nor did it obtain beyond a token commitment from 
most U.S. allies.20 Concerning the five allies that sent troops, Blackburn assigns only 
Australia and New Zealand as legitimate efforts motivated by anti-communism, solely 
because these two countries paid for their own contributions.21 Subsequent U.S. 
historians concurred with Blackburn. Fredrik Logevall calls “more flags” the “few flags 
problem” that “accomplished next to nothing.”22 Logevall declared the non-paying 
contributor nations were not “true allies.”23 This is a common U.S. interpretation, one 
that is quick to dismiss ROK troops as an unfaithful exchange.24 The narrative still 
persists today. A self-published study in 2020 by Charles Hernández, a student from 
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, repeats the same argument.25 He 
states that of all the nations that sent troops, “Vietnam had no direct relevance to South 
Korea’s national interest.”26 Although his is a self-published work, opposed to a product 
of an academic press, the monograph shows the likely interpretation that a general 
American audience would encounter.27 This thesis will challenge the mercenary narrative 
and will bridge this U.S. perspective with that of South Korean scholars. 
 
20 Blackburn, 1-9. 
21 Blackburn, 117-118. 
22 Logevall, Chapter 6, Kindle Edition, Location 3005. 
23 Logevall, Chapter 12, Kindle Edition. Location 5978-5984. Oddly, he does not credit New Zealand as a 
true supporter, while Blackburn does. 
24 For another example from a prominent U.S. scholar, see Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars 1945-
1990 (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 158. 
25 Charles Hernández, Mercenaries in the Vietnam War: Washington’s Hiring of South Korean Soldiers 
(self-pub., 2020), 55. 
26 Hernández, 48.  
27 The book is available for free via Amazon Prime and appears when searching for “South Korean Soldiers 
in the Vietnam War.” Amazon.com : South Korean Soldiers in the Vietnam War (accessed January 14, 
13 
 
South Korean scholars tend to offer a wider and complex analysis of events. 
Byung-Kook Kim explains that Park’s overriding vision for South Korea was “puguk 
kangbyong” (rich nation, strong army) and that anticommunism was South Korea’s 
“kuksi” (national essence). Park, the military dictator of South Korea from 1961-1979, 
prioritized both economic and military improvements as Korea’s path forward. 
Dispatching troops to Vietnam was a move towards gaining U.S. favor, political leverage, 
and legitimacy. Furthermore, Park sought to “construct a regional security network” in 
which South Korea would become further linked to the U.S. on the front lines of the Cold 
War.28 Min Yong Lee expounds upon this South Korean interpretation. Lee asserts that 
Park sought to prevent U.S. troop reductions in South Korea, acquire military force 
modernization, provide South Korean soldiers with combat experience, and become “an 
indispensable strategic ally of the United States.”29 Lee believes that economic 
motivations were strictly secondary in nature. South Korea easily could have sent a token 
commitment of only non-combat support like other U.S. allies. Instead, South Korea sent 
their premier combat divisions, the Capital and 9th Divisions, showing their commitment 
to the alliance was serious. South Korea voluntarily offered to send troops, even prior to 
formal U.S. requests.30  
 
2021). This is relevant to show the available information that would likely appear to a general audience 
interested in the topic. 
28 Byung Kook-Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South 
Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), Introduction, Kindle Edition, Location 219. 
29 Min Yong Lee, “The Vietnam War: South Korea’s Search for National Security,” in Byung Kook-Kim 
and Ezra F. Vogel, eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, Chapter 14, Kindle 
Edition, Location 5668. 
30 Min Yong Lee, Kindle Edition, Location 5654-5828. 
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Not all South Korean scholars are unanimous in this judgement, however. Adding 
to the complexity, historian Park Tae Gyun focuses less on contesting the mercenary 
narrative and more on an internal conflict in South Korean memory concerning economic 
opportunism. Park argues that the ROK’s involvement in Vietnam is largely 
misunderstood today by most South Koreans as a “business opportunity” that was 
necessary for South Korea’s economic takeoff. Park asserts that the Park Chung Hee 
regime deliberately used ROK troops in Vietnam as a bargaining chip, acknowledging 
that the international community perceived them as “de facto mercenaries” to gain 
political leverage over the U.S.31 Park believes South Korea’s participation was a 
mistaken policy because it ultimately led to worse relations with the USG by the 1970s.32  
Park Tae Gyun’s observation that the war was seen as a “business opportunity” 
leads into the second major theme which considers how the war impacted the ROK 
domestically. There is no doubt that the ROK benefited economically from participating 
in Vietnam, but it came at the cost of increasing authoritarianism. Park Chung Hee gained 
immense political leverage, both over the U.S. and domestic opposition which further 
stifled South Korea’s growth towards a true democracy and culminated with Park’s 
despotic Yushin constitution in the 1970’s.  
Scholars who analyze the war’s domestic impacts on the ROK often debate the 
degree of Korean agency at play compared to that of U.S. pressure. Was ROK 
participation in Vietnam best characterized as the U.S. forcing them into the conflict with 
a carrot and a stick, or did the ROK seize an opportunity to ascend to a stronger position 
 
31 Park, 255. 
32 Park, 301. 
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internationally? Many historians, such as Bruce Cumings, Katharine Moon, and Jim 
Glassman write critically of the U.S. support for Park, claiming that the U.S. bore 
culpability in delaying democracy from emerging in South Korea until the 1990’s.33 For a 
contrasting view, both Park Tae Gyun and Gregg Brazinsky stress the “negotiation” 
between the U.S. and ROK as the key to South Korea’s evolution.34 Furthermore, other 
South Korean scholars tend to emphasize that South Korean agency always played the 
pivotal role. Byun-Kook Kim boldly states that the U.S.’s role was “far from that of a 
hegemon” and often an “object of manipulation.”35 Taehyun Kim and Chang Jae Baik 
similarly state “the client more often outmaneuvered the patron.”36  
In summary, the historiographical conversation concerning ROK participation in 
Vietnam centers on two linked debates. Should the ROK military be considered U.S. 
mercenaries? Were the effects of the Vietnam War beneficial or harmful to the ROK in 
the long run, and should they be attributed to U.S. pressure or ROK agency?  
 
33 Bruce Cumings, the most well-known U.S. historian on 20th century Korea, lived in the ROK during the 
60’s and 70’s and was outspoken against Park Chung Hee at the time. Cumings observes the ROK’s 
involvement in Vietnam accelerated Park’s economic initiatives but also enabled blatant human rights 
abuses and repressive policies (Korea’s Place in the Sun, 321, 372). Similarly, Katharine Moon commented 
that the ROK military in its entirety was a “mercenary force” for the U.S. to repress South Korean political 
opposition [Katharine H. S. Moon, Protesting America: Democracy and the U.S.-Korea Alliance (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2012), 202-203]. Jim Glassman asserts that the U.S. 
military industrial complex, specifically through the Korean and Vietnam Wars, created a “Pacific Ruling 
Class”. Thus, the “east Asian miracles” were inextricably tied to the “east Asian massacres” of Cold War 
conflict [Jim Glassman, Drums of War, Drums of Development (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2019), 3, 17, 
376]. 
34Concerning Vietnam, Brazinsky suggests, “[South Korea’s] motives for assisting the United States 
apparently were a combination of economic opportunism and a strong belief in personal sacrifice for the 
greater good of the nation.” [Gregg Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and 
the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 11]. Park Tae Gyun 
also stresses the concept of negotiation between the two powers (Park, 5-7). 
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This thesis will add to the conversation of U.S./ROK relations during the Vietnam 
War in four chapters. Chapter 1 explains why the ROKG entered Vietnam for political, 
national defense, and economic motivations, and retraces the origins of the mercenary 
narrative. Next, Chapter 2 argues for South Korea’s legitimate national interest in the 
Vietnam War as intricately linked to conflict with North Korea. Chapter 3 evaluates the 
ROK’s military performance in Vietnam and argues the ROK military does not fit the 
mercenary label and reflected the degree of ROKG’s national interest. Lastly, Chapter 4 
concludes with the negative aftermath of the war when USG and ROKG national 
interests diverged. The war’s aftermath led to a sharp decline in U.S./ROK relations and a 




Chapter 1: “Aladdin’s Lamp” - Why the ROK Joined the Vietnam 
War 
 
“There has been growing feeling in ROKG and Korean public that ROK 
troop dispatch to Vietnam has strengthened “special relationship” between 
US and ROK which justifies having their desires, whether in political, 
economic or defense area, being given special and unique consideration by 
USG…In short, they see the 50,000 ROK troops in Vietnam as their 
“Aladdin's Lamp” to make all their dreams come true.”37 
 -William Porter, U.S. Ambassador to the ROK, November 25, 1967 
 
William Porter called the deployment of ROK troops in Vietnam an “Aladdin’s 
lamp,” through which the ROKG boldly sought maximum concessions from the USG. 
Porter’s comment identified the ROKG’s pursuit of national interests, that Vietnam 
enabled them to fulfill their goals (“make all their dreams come true”). ROK national 
interests comprised three goals: political stability, national defense, and economic 
development. The pursuit of these goals explained the ROKG’s decision to enter the 
Vietnam War. Park required USG buy-in to survive domestic opposition following his 
1961 coup and the ongoing struggle to normalize relations with Japan. Once stabilized 
politically, subsequent troop negotiations focused on gaining concessions towards 
national defense and economic development aimed at surpassing their rival, North Korea. 
In conducting this exchange, USG and ROKG officials were highly sensitive that 
international opinion would view this trade as a “mercenary” transaction of blood for 
treasure. Despite steps from both administrations to control public appearance and 
minimize controversy, the mercenary narrative took hold and proved to have a lasting 
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presence. Chapter 1 will first analyze how the ROK’s Vietnam deployments achieved 
political, defense, and economic national interests. Secondly, it will analyze how and why 
domestic opposition in both the U.S. and ROK predominately viewed these events as a 
“mercenary” exchange. 
 
Three Wishes: Political, Defense, Economical 
ROKG’s first and foremost reason for entering the Vietnam War was the pursuit 
of political stability. The early Park government from 1961-1963 began on the wrong 
foot. After successfully installing himself as the ROK’s executive, Park faced strong 
domestic opposition combined with U.S. hesitancy. Adopting a “wait and see” approach 
during the coup, the USG only tacitly approved of him. In the early 60’s, USG was 
revaluating aid policies towards Korea out of frustration over the ROK’s lack of 
economic progress. The USG invested more time and money into the ROK as a 
developmental project of the Cold War than anywhere else in the world (about $200 
million annually, by comparison all of Western Europe combined received $259 million 
in 1959), and yet the ROK was still heavily dependent on U.S. aid during Park’s coup.38 
Park’s obstinacy towards following U.S. economic advice and reluctance to hold a 
democratic election drove the USG to increase pressure.39 Additionally, the USG planned 
troop withdrawals off the peninsula as Vietnam began to displace Korea as the military 
priority. Troop withdrawals combined with the ongoing debate over ROK/Japan 
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normalization to signal to the South Korean people that the U.S. was abandoning them. 
Potential U.S. withdrawal worried ROKG, which was still largely dependent on U.S. 
financial aid and military defense against North Korea, who in the 60’s was economically 
and militarily ahead of South Korea.  
Normalizing ROK/Japanese relations became the largest politically destabilizing 
issue in Park’s early years. The USG believed Japan could take over a share of the burden 
in propping up South Korea’s economy.40 However, many South Koreans vehemently 
protested any degree of reconciliation with Japan. Protests in Seoul occurred with over 
20,000 students taking to the streets to protest. The U.S. was concerned there may be a 
repeat of the April 1960 student-led protests that ousted Syngman Rhee. U.S. 
Ambassador Samuel Berger lamented that the “situation in Korea has again reached a 
peak of uncertainty, unrest and disarray,” and was “most grave and fraught with difficulty 
since the May 16, 1961 coup.”41 The U.S. even began planning for contingency 
operations in the event of another coup (again recommending the “wait and see” 
approach provided the coup was non-communist).42 Under the duress of domestic 
opposition, Park could not be certain of much needed U.S. cooperation. The USG easily 
could have abandoned Park under the circumstances. In response to the unrest, Park 
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declared martial law and turned to the U.S. for a path forward by promising ROK/Japan 
normalization and joining the Vietnam War.43  
Park first offered to dispatch combat troops to Vietnam to seek U.S. approval and 
legitimization. In 1964, the U.S. “more flags” program explicitly requested only non-
combat support. By this time, the ROK had already committed its non-combat package (a 
MASH, Taekwondo instructors, and the ‘Dove’ Unit). Stressing that combat troops 
would not be necessary, Ambassador Winthrop Brown told Park, “This was not that kind 
of war.” In the same conversation, Park hinted he was willing to send two combat 
divisions in addition to mobilizing large numbers of recently discharged veterans, whom 
Park claimed were willing to fight in Vietnam if they could be equipped and 
transported.44 The offer came at a turning point in the U.S. escalation of the Vietnam 
War, and President Johnson was eager to maximize international involvement. Park’s 
offer caught the interest of U.S. State officials and would become a key issue in sealing 
USG support for Park through his 1965 state visit.   
In a moment that signaled the alignment of USG and ROKG national interests, 
Park achieved his goal of political legitimacy by the time of his U.S. state visit in May 
1965. Brown wrote to Secretary Bill Bundy that Park was seeking the “U.S. blessing to 
ease his task of gaining public acceptance” and that the visit was a chance to “get the 
ROKG moving again.”45 Expecting progress on the Japan settlement and troops for 
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Vietnam, the USG made it loud and clear that they fully supported Park and that Vietnam 
was a shared interest. Starting on May 17, 1965, the USG treated Park like royalty over a 
ten-day state visit. The formalities included a parade in New York City, luncheons, 
banquets, and a farewell party attended by President Johnson. 46 Park received full 
military honors in a reception at the White House South Lawn, in which Johnson 
delivered a warm speech that stressed their common interests. Vietnam conspicuously 
surfaced in Johnson’s speech: “We welcome this strength that your land offers now to the 
defense of freedom not only in Korea but in Viet-Nam as well, Mr. President.” Park 
responded by confirming Vietnam as a shared interest: “Along the truce line in Korea, in 
the jungles of Viet-Nam, your beloved sons and husbands now share the same 
encampment and trenches with our own men to defend freedom from Communist 
aggression.”47 Park’s final toast at the end of the visit signaled that Korea would “stave 
off the Red influx in Southeast Asia, arm in arm with the United States…Korea will 
continue to be a faithful comrade...for many years to come…We are very proud to do 
so…”.48 USG and ROKG interests aligned; Park gained legitimization as the ROK’s 
executive and the USG gained manpower for Vietnam. 
Upon his return, Park followed through on his commitment to resolving the Japan 
settlement and dispatching combat troops to Vietnam. Within a month, the ROK and 
Japan drafted the “Treaty on Basic Relations” on June 22, 1965. Park arranged the ROK 
assembly to vote on the treaty and the Vietnam deployments in the same legislative 
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session on August 13, 1965.49 Both decisions met widespread resistance domestically, as 
reconciling with Japan and sending troops to a foreign war did not appeal to most South 
Koreans.50 Opposition leader Yun Po-sun and 23 other members boycotted the vote. One 
opposition party member prophetically doubted that the U.S. truly intended to “persevere 
in Vietnamese war” and that South Korea should not “become involved in situation 
which appears hopeless.”51 Despite the opposition, and reflective of Park’s political 
stranglehold over ROKG, the assembly approved the Vietnam decision with 101 in favor, 
1 against, and 2 abstentions. 52 Concluding the Japan and Vietnam decisions went a long 
way in legitimizing Park in the eyes of USG, and correspondingly gave him 
exponentially more political clout and influence in ROKG.  
Regarding the first combat deployment, political stability was the ROKG’s 
foremost motivation; USG concessions were relatively few compared to future 
negotiations. Regarding all subsequent deployments, the ROKG would make full use of 
their newfound leverage to gain concessions on national security and economic 
development, directly in line with Park’s vision of “puguk kangbyong” (rich nation, 
strong army). Within less than year, the USG continued to ask for more troops in a 
pattern that would continue until 1968. The ROKG now had a valuable bargaining chip, 
something that the USG desperately wanted as the Vietnam War intensified. ROKG used 
 
49 Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, June 3, 1965. FRUS Korea 
1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1. According to the U.S. embassy, Park purposely combined the two 
issues so that the “opposition would have problem where to concentrate its fire.” 
50 Brazinsky, 137. 




this bargaining chip with an eye towards North Korea by seeking concessions towards 
national defense. 
The ROKG’s second most motivation regarding Vietnam deployments was the 
pursuit of national defense. Their chief rival, North Korea, was ahead both economically 
and militarily by a wide margin in the 60’s and remained an existential threat. North 
Korean military provocations across the DMZ increased by the hundreds, (peaking in 
major incidents in 1968 – discussed in Chapter 2). ROKG used their newfound leverage 
over the U.S. to bolster their own military capability and prevent U.S. withdrawal from 
the region. In the late 50’s, the USG was reconsidering its foreign aid priorities in the 
world and looked at South Korea as a sunk cost, as the country that received by far the 
most aid appeared to be achieving little progress.53 After Park’s Vietnam decision, the 
USG swiftly reversed course on key national defense spending decisions for the ROK. 
The ROK’s Vietnam deployments directly prevented the U.S. planned Military 
Assistance Program (MAP) transfer. The ROK’s portion of MAP accounted for $200 
million, which the U.S. intended to cut it down to $153 million in 1964 and cut another 
$20 million by 1965.54 The Vietnam decision reversed this completely. By 1967, 
President Johnson ordered that there would be absolutely no cuts to the ROK’s MAP 
portion, even as the total U.S. MAP global budget reduced from $620 million to $400 
million (all these cuts would occur elsewhere).55 In 1964, U.S. aid accounted for two 
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thirds of the ROK defense budget, such that any cuts to the MAP would have severe 
impacts on ROK military spending.56 By keeping their share of the MAP, ROKG 
maintained their current level of spending. 
Additionally, ROKG’s Vietnam decision directly delayed planned U.S. troop 
withdrawals in United States Forces Korea (USFK). By 1964, the U.S. intended to 
reassign 12,000 U.S. soldiers out of Korea and reduce funding for ROK forces by 70,000 
(out of 580,000) phased over two years.57 Brown advised the State Department to 
reconsider, stating: “…the prospect of further Korean troops for RVN would be highly 
adverse for obvious reasons.”58 Following Brown’s advice, the USG delayed the troop 
reductions. 59 President Johnson personally promised Park that no U.S. troops would 
withdraw from the ROK without Park’s prior knowledge. Success on these two issues, 
MAP transfer and troop reductions, were two major national-defense concessions that 
encouraged ROKG to press their newfound leverage even further. 
The single largest series of defense and economic concessions came with the 
ROK’s second combat deployment in 1966. Pushing the envelope, ROKG handed the 
U.S. embassy a wish list of ten items which Brown called “extremely unreasonable.” 60 
The list covered a wide gambit of military and economic projects. Items ranged from 
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covering ¾ of the entire ROK military budget until 1971 to items as diverse as a fund for 
cultural projects. Upon receiving the list, both the State and Defense Department rejected 
the proposal. Samuel Berger stated the list “caused some disappointment here…We have 
thought that the mendicant period of Korean history was drawing to a close…,” a 
reference to the previous decade of U.S. aid’s lack of results in Korea. McNamara 
reported to President Johnson that the Koreans were asking for “about $600-700 million 
worth of cumshaw” which far exceeded U.S. predictions.61 Ultimately, in only a matter 
of weeks, the USG was so desperate for the manpower in Vietnam that they caved in on 
ROKG requests.62  
 The final list of U.S. concessions became known to the South Korean public in 
the “Brown Memorandum” on March 8, 1966 (see Appendix C).63 The list was a treasure 
trove of military and economic bonuses which ROKG hoped would convince the South 
Korean public of the justification in deploying a second combat division. Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk called this list “not only fair, but generous, and should provide the basis 
for an effective presentation to the Korean people.”64 This was a shocking reversal from 
U.S. officials’ surprised reaction just weeks earlier. Such a change in attitudes reflected 
the USG’s increasing desperation in Vietnam and the need for immediate influx of 
personnel. By 1967, the U.S. had already committed 20% of the U.S. Army to Vietnam 
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and was eager for increased ROK commitments.65 Dean Rusk expressed as much: “I need 
not stress that the matter is urgent and the stakes very high, for Korea as well as the Free 
World.”66  
 Suspending the MAP transfer, delaying USFK troop reductions, and a generous 
package of military modernization items, benefits, and bonuses were all extravagant 
concession towards improving the ROK’s national defense. U.S. concessions were not 
limited to a military nature. On the civilian side, the ROKG pursued aggressive economic 
opportunities through war-time production, contracting, and procurement.  
The ROKG’s third motivation for Vietnam participation was economic 
development. In exchange for their commitments, ROKG expected heavy favoritism in 
war-time civilian contracting. In 1965, Defense Minister Sung Eun Kim said that he “is 
not seeking any bargains” in sending additional ROK troops. Yet, in the same 
conversation, Kim made a comparison to Japan’s role during the Korean War. Kim’s 
analogy stated that the Japanese got rich from the Korean War “while the Koreans did the 
fighting” and now the same thing must happen for Koreans in South Vietnam. Kim 
claimed the ROK required a “special advantage” in gaining business contracts for the 
war.67 Brown relayed this message to the State Department, reporting that “it will be 
utterly impossible for them [ROKG] to understand why there can be no preferred 
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treatment,” regarding Vietnam contracts.68 The USG, desperate for the manpower, was 
inclined to give it to them. 
 The ROKG acquired an economic golden opportunity through their Vietnam 
participation. The USG gave ROKG the contracts to rural reconstruction and pacification 
in Vietnam, as well as contracts for construction projects throughout Southeast Asia. 
Beyond paying for the deployments themselves, estimates for the total U.S. payout to the 
ROK from 1965-1970 ranged as high as $5 billion. Between 1965 and 1968, the ROK 
gained $402 million from business contracts related to the Vietnam War.69 South Korean 
revenues from the war made up 40% of their foreign earnings for the period. 70 South 
Korea received preferential treatment for all OSP contracts and did not have to compete 
with non-U.S. bidders.71 94% of South Korean steel exports and 52% of transportation 
equipment exports went to Vietnam. From 1965-1968, South Korea’ economy grew by 
10% per year, domestic revenues doubled, and exports grew tenfold from 1961-1968.72  
 Undeniably, ROKG reaped enormous benefits from participating in Vietnam. 
John Lie calls the Vietnam War one of the “external and contingent factors,” that 
combined with the normalization of relations with Japan to enable South Korea to 
achieve modernization despite Park’s otherwise failing policies. 73 Park’s controversial 
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decisions were unpopular domestically, yet they incorporated the ROK economy firmly 
into the U.S. and Japanese economic sphere in 1965. The exchange of Vietnam 
deployments for political, defense, and economic concessions, comprised the chief 
motives of the ROKG. USG and ROKG interests became aligned. The exchange also 
came with a very powerful appearance of the ROKG selling its soldiers to the U.S. as 
mercenaries, forming a powerful narrative that surfaced at the time and persists in 
present-day.  
 
Origin of the Mercenary Narrative 
Both the USG and ROKG were keenly aware of the appearance of the ROK 
military in Vietnam as mercenaries. The mercenary label brought heightened anxiety to 
both governments because it undermined the stated foreign policy goals of the USG and 
the autonomy of the ROKG. USG Cold War foreign interventions operated on a rhetoric 
of promoting liberal democracies in the world to improve a country’s political stability, 
civic freedoms, and quality of life. South Korea had long been the U.S.’s largest 
developmental project to prove the merits of liberal democracy over those of a 
communist alternative in the Cold War.74 If international opinion now saw South Korea 
allegedly selling out their military to the U.S. or in some way bowing to U.S. pressure, 
this rhetoric would lose validity. Likewise, the appearance gave communist adversaries a 
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propaganda angle to characterize South Korea as a “puppet army” of the U.S., a theme 
Kim Il Sung and North Korea had already been using since the Korean War.75     
Winthrop Brown, the U.S. Ambassador to the ROK from 1964 to 1967, 
presciently foreshadowed that the mercenary label was likely to become the international 
interpretation of events. Originally against accepting ROK combat troops in 1965, Brown 
advised the State Department the “time is not now propitious” for a combat deployment. 
Brown cautioned, “Hue and cry will bewilder [ROK] general public” for sending their 
young men to a foreign war when poverty at home and North Korea next door appeared 
more urgent matters.76 The consequences could potentially have backfired by 
strengthening the ROK domestic political opposition and creating political instability. 
Brown further warned: “It is the risk of creating a situation in which Korea appears to its 
own people and to others in the world not as an independent and willing contributor to a 
struggle in which it has a vital interest, but as a puppet or vassal of the US, brought into 
danger in distant Southeast Asia and at home to serve the interests of the US.”77 
Brown astutely captured the essence of the mercenary narrative and brought into question 
the nature of the ROKG’s “interests.”  
 However, the mercenary narrative was not a complete explanation of the ROKG’s 
interests. Brown, perhaps through virtue of physically being in Korea and closest to those 
involved in the negotiations, had a unique view of events that was both cautious and 
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sympathetic. While he did warn the State department of the consequences of the 
mercenary appearance, Brown himself did not critically question Korean motivations as 
unethical or purely monetary focused. In fact, he acknowledged Korean veterans took 
great pride in their anti-Communist stance and would be eager to help a “country 
threatened by a common enemy.”78 In a later statement reflecting on Korea’s stake in the 
conflict, Brown appeared to change his mind with a more encouraging view:  
It is fair to say to Korea that this battle is hers as well as ours, that she can afford 
the men, that it is her duty to return in some measure the help rendered her so 
unstintingly by the free world in the past, and that we will ensure that this will not 
involve her in extra cost. But it is also a cold fact that Korea does not have to do 
this, that it does involve Korea in some additional risk, that a well-trained combat 
division can be a real contribution to the struggle, and that it can save us a great 
deal in blood and treasure.79 
Here again Brown spoke of the question of national interests. He believed the ROK had a 
stake in the conflict (“hers as well as ours”), that the ROK’s decision was voluntary 
(“does not have to do this”) and could have a real impact on the Vietnam War (“save us a 
great deal in blood and treasure”). 
 As Brown advised, both the USG and ROKG took active steps towards 
controlling the mercenary appearance. Both governments agreed that they should “do 
everything possible” to prevent the public from knowing that the U.S. was directly 
paying the ROK combat forces.80 Secretary of State Dean Rusk emphasized the limited 
nature of the first ROK deployment in a response to Brown: “we are most anxious to 
have this appear—as indeed is the fact—as a limited measure to secure particular areas 
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and conduct limited operations from them [ROK troops].” Rusk stressed that the U.S. not 
“jump the gun…to avoid most serious consequences in GVN [South Vietnam] and in 
world attitudes.”81 Despite these efforts, the exchange proved impossible to hide, and the 
mercenary appearance quickly surfaced as Brown feared. 
Several embarrassments revealed both government’s vain attempts at influencing 
public perception. ROK Minister of Defense Sung Eun Kim let slip that the U.S. agreed 
to take over payments for the currently existing ROK forces in Vietnam (the Dove unit), 
something USG wanted kept secret. In response, the U.S. embassy now explicitly wrote 
of concern for critics “charges that ROK forces are being used as mercenaries.”82 
Another embarrassing incident came when South Vietnam sent an appreciative letter to 
the ROKG to congratulate them on their decision to send more troops. Unfortunately, the 
letter preceded the ROKG’s legislative approval of the deployment, making it appear that 
Park had already committed the troops without the approval of his legislature. Park urged 
the letter “be kept completely secret in view [of] obvious embarrassment to his 
government should its contents become known.”83  
The announcement of the second combat division (1966) was even more secretive 
than the first. President Johnson demanded that the finalized decision not be announced, 
so instead USG maintained the appearance of ongoing negotiations. To better sell the 
decision to the Korean public, ROKG requested the announcement be made only in a 
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joint statement that emphasized U.S. voluntary concessions. Brown reported that the 
ROKG desired a statement that would “stress that Korea was acting in its own interest 
and in common defense rather than as result of financial bargaining with U.S.” While the 
list of U.S. concessions would help to convince the Korean public of the decision’s 
justification, these concessions had to appear as “spontaneous” actions of gratitude, rather 
than as a U.S. purchase. 84   
Despite government efforts to control information, oppositional voices in both 
countries quickly criticized the ROK’s Vietnam decision with the mercenary label. 
Senator Stephen Young (D) lambasted the Johnson administration in an address in 1967 
where he compared the ROK troops to Great Britain’s use of Hessian mercenaries in the 
Revolutionary War. 85 The U.S. Senate investigated the matter in the Symington 
Subcommittee Hearings from 1969 to 1970. Senators J. William Fulbright (D) and Stuart 
Symington (D) denounced U.S. compensation to Asian allies for being in “excess of our 
[U.S.] explicit treaty obligations,” and criticized the “exorbitant mercenary pay.”86 In the 
ROK, opposition leader Yun Po-Sun was nearly arrested for criticizing the decision as a 
mercenary exchange. 87 Park’s authoritarian rule made any resistance or public statements 
against the government’s decision a highly dangerous and often illegal act. In contrast to 
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the ROKG’s heavy-handed censorship, the U.S. faced a vigorous and growing anti-war 
protest campaign. The mercenary narrative could only add more fuel to the fire. 
While the Johnson administration resisted the mercenary interpretation, evidence 
also showed U.S. State Department officials taking the ROK’s contribution for granted as 
an item to be purchased, and their communications often strengthened the credence of the 
mercenary narrative. For instance, in seeking the second deployment in 1966, the State 
Department instructed Brown to “to exert maximum pressure to obtain these forces for a 
reasonable price.”88 McGeorge Bundy told William Porter that the U.S. wanted the 
“maximum additional ROK troop contribution,” while avoiding “the ‘diminishing 
returns' and ‘Aladdin's Lamp' pitfalls.”89 As the Vietnam War languished into a 
quagmire, Dean Rusk, a strong supporter of the Vietnam War, appeared completely 
insensitive to the ROKG’s position. Rusk argued for increased ROK contributions, going 
as high as 90,000. He concluded “it is entirely reasonable to expect further Korean 
combat contribution to SVN and that it should not be necessary for US to pay too stiff 
economic or political price for this contribution.”90 Such a calculation showed a complete 
disregard to South Korean domestic opinion, the ROK troops already committed, or 
political repercussions for Park. In response, Brown was horrified at the thought of 
asking for additional troops beyond the second combat division: 
We asked for a small medical unit and got it (a few hundred). We asked for a 
much larger non-combat unit and got it (2000 men). We then asked for a combat 
division and got it (20,000 men). After an embarrassingly short interval we asked 
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for a further combat brigade and division, and we seem to have it (about 30,000 
men). Now, before we have even given the Koreans a chance to solidify their 
decision on the last brigade and division, we are contemplating asking them for 
ten thousand more. When will this end?91 
Again, Brown expressed a cautious and realistic summary of events. He believed 
the USG was pushing the issue too far and too fast (“embarrassingly short interval”). The 
answer to Brown’s question “When will this end?” came sooner than expected. The U.S. 
continued to request ROK combat troops until 1968, to which the ROKG could have 
complied in exchange for ever increasing economic rewards. However, the ROKG turned 
down the last round of negotiations. By 1968, serious North Korean provocations 
refocused ROKG priorities and shifted their interests. The ROKG joined the Vietnam 
War to obtain political stability, national defense, and economic opportunity. After 1968, 
political stability and national defense were both in jeopardy at home, making additional 
deployments out of the question.  
The U.S. financial compensation to ROK soldiers gave the mercenary narrative a 
powerful credence and staying power, yet this was not the ROKG’s sole motivation. 
Their goals comprised political, defense, and economic aims in accordance with Park’s 
national vision. The mercenary narrative’s underlying assumption was one of Korea’s 
national interests. Did South Korea have a stake in the Vietnam War’s outcome? Their 
chief rival, North Korea, was also a player in the conflict. What was North Korea doing 
at this time, and did this impact the ROKG’s decisions? The two would violently clash in 
a renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula at the same time the Vietnam War raged in 
the background. South Korea’s position in relation to North Korea may shed additional 
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Chapter 2: A Linked Struggle - The ROK’s Stake in Vietnam 
 
 “An American victory in Vietnam is a victory for Korea, and an American defeat 
in Vietnam a defeat for the ROK.” 92 
   - Chung Il Kwon, ROK Prime Minister, March 8, 1968 
 
While U.S. and ROK soldiers waged war in Vietnam, a struggle much closer to 
South Korea’s borders intensified. Historians Mitchell Lerner and Mark Felton refer to 
this overlooked conflict between South and North Korea from 1966-1969 as the “Second 
Korean War.”93 The label is fitting for the scope and intensity of the violence. North 
Korean guerrilla infiltration and border skirmishes along the Korean DMZ increased 
dramatically and caused hundreds of casualties (including U.S.) on both sides. In January 
1968, North Korean commandoes raided the South Korean Blue House in a failed attempt 
to assassinate Park Chung Hee. Two days later, North Korea seized the U.S. spy ship 
Pueblo, taking captive eighty-three sailors for eleven months. The following year, April 
1969, North Korea shot down a U.S. spy plane, killing all thirty-one crew members. Was 
it merely a coincidence that these events occurred during the height of the Vietnam War, 
or was there a connection? If such a connection existed, does it add a legitimizing 
national interest and rationale in the ROK’s participation in the Vietnam War, one that 
challenges the mercenary epithet?  
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Both USG and ROKG saw the Korean peninsula and Vietnam as linked theaters 
of war. ROKG’s interests in Vietnam participation were tied to defense against North 
Korean aggression at home. Evidence points to North Korean provocations during “The 
Second Korean War” as intentionally concurrent with the Vietnam War as a window of 
opportunity to exploit U.S. preoccupation in Vietnam. While North Korean hostilities 
severely tested the U.S./ROK alliance and began to push their respective interests into 
misalignment, their provocations also linked USG and ROKG’s fates in Vietnam for the 
duration of the war. ROKG could not withdraw their troops without jeopardizing U.S. 
defense commitments in Korea. The Second Korean War was a justifying component for 
the ROKG’s Vietnam decision, as they saw themselves in peril of becoming the next 
Cold War battleground once again. 
 
North Versus South: At Home and Abroad 
North and South Korea were both international actors taking advantage of the 
Vietnam War to suit their own interests, and both linked their efforts in Vietnam back to 
their rivalry on the peninsula. South Korea, as seen in Chapter 1, leveraged Vietnam 
deployments to acquire political, defense, and economic concessions from the U.S., 
aimed with the goal, in the words of the ROK’s deputy prime minister, of becoming 
“stronger than North Korea.”94 North Korea, on the other hand, exploited the Vietnam 
War as a window of opportunity to escalate provocations against South Korea and test the 
waters for a communist reunification of the Korean peninsula. Evidence from diplomatic 
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embassies in North Korea reveals a clear connection between renewed North Korean 
provocations as intentionally concurrent with the Vietnam War. North Korea was 
emboldened during this period and expected the U.S. to exercise restraint against 
retaliating due to their preoccupation in Vietnam.  
 North Korea actively supported the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) 
during the Vietnam War. North Korea took notice when South Korea committed troops to 
Vietnam and responded by stepping up their own support of the DRV. A record of 
conversation between Kim Il Sung and the Chinese Friendship Delegation in 1965 is 
quite telling. Kim refers to the “puppet army in South Korea” going to Vietnam and 
declares “We [North Korea] are supporting Vietnam as if it were our own war.”95 In 1965 
North Korea sent over 2,000 tons, 80 train cars full, worth of construction materials and 
military automobiles to North Vietnam.96 North Korea also sent 100 Air Force personnel, 
consisting of pilots and technicians to man two MiG-17 companies (10 planes each) and 
one MiG-21 company.97 North Korea, to a lesser degree than the South, was now an 
active participant in the Vietnam War. 
North and South Korean rivalry directly extended into the Vietnam War itself. 
Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) ambassador to the DPRK, Nguyen Long 
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stated that the DPRK has strong ties to the NLF through their embassy in Hanoi. 
Ambassador Nguyen reported that North Koreans were active in South Vietnam, and that 
they are primarily in “those areas where South Korean troops are operating, so as to study 
their fighting tactics, techniques, combat readiness and the morale of the South Korean 
Army, and to use propaganda against the South Koreans.”98 Another diplomat’s telegram 
from the DPRK stated that “The [North] Korean people are effectively prepared and 
always ready to fight alongside the Vietnamese people, whenever the Vietnamese people 
need it.”99 The North Korean Central News agency confirmed this to a U.S. source: “You 
see we are ready to send our troops at any time whenever Vietnam (North) wants our 
participation,” and then immediately connected this statement to a threat on the Korean 
peninsula: “Should a war break out in Korea the US won't be able to send its troops to 
Korea since it's so deeply involved in the Vietnam war.”100 These statements support the 
notion that North Korea’s efforts in Vietnam directly connected to events in Korea. 
North Korea’s investment in North Vietnam was linked towards a communist-led 
reunification of the Korean peninsula. The Soviet Embassy in the DPRK reported in 1966 
that China was allegedly pressuring North Korea to restart hostilities along the Korean 
DMZ.101 In 1967, the Romanian ambassador to the DPRK reported of an upcoming 
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“great revolutionary event” in North Korea that would “result in either the definitive 
solution of the Korean problem and the expulsion of American forces, or the 
acknowledgment of the existence of two Korean states through an international treaty, 
which would replace the current armistice.” He predicted that upon North Vietnam’s 
successful conclusion of the war, the United States would be “politically and militarily 
paralyzed” and could not possibly assist in yet another Korean War after the sheer 
exhaustion and drop in international opinion. 102 Another telegram reported, if the U.S. 
was defeated in Vietnam, “the North Koreans will take advantage of this moment and 
pursue the liberation of the South.”103 Yet another communist observer remarked that 
DPRK officials “view the Vietnamese events primarily from the point of view of their 
possible consequences for Korea,” and that the reunification of the Korean peninsula 
depended “to a large degree on the outcome” of the Vietnam War.104 Clearly, ample 
evidence existed to support the connection between the Vietnam War and North Korea’s 
renewed aggression. 
The Korean peninsula reached a state of near war through increased violence and 
major incidents culminating in 1968. Military provocations from 1965 to 1967 included 
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191 combat engagements at the DMZ and 112 combat engagements south of the ceasefire 
line. These armed clashes collectively caused 223 North Korean casualties, 412 United 
Nations casualties, and 116 South Korean casualties. In 1967, there was on average one 
incident per day.105 U.S. intelligence began to examine if North Korean attacks were at 
all related to the Vietnam War. 
U.S. intelligence saw a strong connection between North Korean provocations 
and Vietnam. In 1966, a U.S. intel report analyzing the North’s DMZ incursions 
originally doubted the North Korean intention of opening a “second front” for Vietnam, 
but instead likely intended their provocations to serve as a warning to the ROK against 
further deployments to Vietnam.106 This view evolved overtime. Eighth Army 
Commanding General Bonesteel cautioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that these 
developments [North Korean DMZ incursions] were the “most vicious and flagrant 
violation of the Armistice Agreement in many years.” Bonesteel believed North Korea 
was testing South Korea’s response as a precursor to further action.107 A year later, the 
Director of U.S. Defense Research and Engineering, John Foster Jr., confirmed 
Bonesteel’s view: “Based on the theory that the United States cannot support more than 
one “Vietnam” at a time, he [Kim Il Sung] hopes to create a situation that will prevent the 
ROK from sending more troops to Vietnam, cripple the ROK economy, cause the United 
 
105 Park, 282-283. 
106 Intelligence Memorandum Washington, November 8, 1966. No. 1620/66 ARMED INCIDENTS 
ALONG THE KOREAN DMZ, FRUS Korea 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1. 
107 Telegram From the Commanding General, United States Eighth Army, Korea, and the Commander in 
Chief, United Nations Command, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 
Seoul, November 10, 1966, FRUS Korea 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1. 
42 
 
States to withdraw, and eventually communize the country.”108 The U.S. interrogation of 
a North Korean agent revealed: “NK’s evaluate US as so overextended in support [of] 
Vietnam that we [U.S.] would be unable adequately to reinforce Korea in case of war.”109 
North Korea did not expect a strong U.S. retaliation and increased the level of their 
provocations. North Korea’s prediction of a limited U.S. response proved to be accurate. 
The Blue House Raid on January 21, 1968 was North Korea’s most severe 
escalation yet. Thirty North Korean commandoes infiltrated the presidential mansion, 
killed several civilians, and almost made it to Park himself. Their mission, according to 
one of the infiltrators, was “to chop off President Pak Chung Hee’s head and to shoot to 
death his key subordinates in that building.” 110 South Korean security killed five 
commandoes and eventually captured all but one of the infiltrators, while 68 South 
Koreans and 3 Americans died in the process.111 The event traumatized Park and his 
family and led to increased calls for unilateral retaliation from the ROKG. Two days 
later, another major North Korean incident occurred. 
The North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo on January 23, 1968 was another 
major incident that almost restarted the Korean War. The USS Pueblo was an American 
spy ship taking part in Operation Clickbeetle. Its mission was to gather signals 
intelligence from North Korea and the USSR in the Sea of Japan. U.S. Navy officials left 
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the Pueblo horrendously unprepared for its mission, inappropriately gave the mission a 
“minimal” risk, and allocated no support or “on call” forces in case of an incident.112 
Alleging the Pueblo crossed into North Korean territory, the North Koreans violently 
seized the ship, which offered no resistance, and took eighty-three men captive.113 In an 
ordeal that would last over eleven months, the Johnson administration delicately 
negotiated for the crew’s release without sparking a renewed Korean War. The seizure of 
the Pueblo left the ROKG scrambling for a renewed call to action against North Korea 
aggression. The ROKG greatly resented not being included in the negotiations over the 
release of the Pueblo’s crew. The ROK’s Anti-Communist league sponsored a rally of 
over 100,000 people in Seoul to protest the U.S.’s peaceful response.114 The U.S. walked 
a tightrope of calming ROKG tempers and negotiating with North Korea, all while the 
Vietnam War reached its low point. 
Considering these major incidents, the U.S. continued to interpret them in the 
context of Vietnam and speculated as to the possibility of direct coordination by their 
adversaries. Concerning the Pueblo incident’s proximity to the Tet offensive, LBJ 
directly asked: “Is there one man calling the dance?” Cyrus Vance (Deputy Secretary of 
Defense) replied he was not certain.115 Outside of the U.S., other countries asked the 
same question. The USSR also made the linkage. Canadian ambassador to the USSR, R. 
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Ford proposed the question with USSR diplomat S. P. Kozyrev: “Personally, he [Ford] 
does not believe that such a connection exists but if it does this undoubtedly complicates 
the position of the Americans,” and “I [S.P. Kozyrev], replied that there really is a 
connection between the events in Vietnam and Korea” because of the larger U.S. imperial 
aggression in Vietnam and Korea.116 Bonesteel concluded that North Korea sought to 
prosecute “porous warfare” akin to the rhetoric of Che Guevara and his call of “Many 
Vietnams.” U.S. intelligence concluded that North Korea saw the U.S. as overextended in 
Vietnam and was “unable to adequately assist ROK during this period.”117 Events in the 
Vietnam War affected USG, ROKG, and DPRK decisions in Korea. The two theaters of 
war were linked. 
The provocations of the “Second Korean War” severely tested U.S./ROK 
relations. Johnson wrote to Park to reassure him of U.S. commitments: “Our mutual 
objectives of peace, security and progress in Asia require us to make it entirely clear to 
the men in Pyongyang and in Hanoi that terror and lawlessness will not succeed and that 
their diversionary tactics will have no effect.” The U.S. saw Pyongyang and Hanoi’s 
efforts as one in the same. Johnson ended his letter with: “It is good to be able to share 
one’s thoughts with a trusted friend and ally.”118 Trust, however, was an item quickly 
losing stock between the U.S. and ROK. 
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End of the Honeymoon 
South Korean historians refer to the period of 1965 to 1968 as a “milwol” 
(honeymoon) in U.S./ROK relations, referencing the economic and political boosts from 
the ROK’s combat deployments to Vietnam.119 This is the period when USG and ROKG 
interests were most aligned. By January 1968, the honeymoon was over, and the two 
country’s interests began to change. The USG and ROKG sharply diverged on how best 
to respond to North Korea’s hostilities. Park planned a massive retaliation upon North 
Korea, directly clashing with the USG plans that urged restraint. The timing could not 
have been worse. 1968 was the height of the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese Tet 
Offensive occurred only eight days after the Pueblo incident. The Tet Offensive was a 
boiling point of the Vietnam War for the U.S. with massive domestic implications 
spurring anti-war protests. The last thing the U.S. could have stomached was starting a 
new Korean War at the same time efforts in Vietnam were in crisis.  
North Korean provocations tested the limits against a theoretically demoralized 
and inhibited U.S. military presence intractably entangled in Vietnam. Park, visibly 
shaken by the Blue House Raid, desired a massive retaliation in kind. ROK intelligence 
pinpointed six locations across the DMZ where North Korean agents were training for 
covert missions. Park wanted to strike all six of these areas, but the U.S., fearful of a full-
scale war escalating, insisted on restraint. The ROKG chafed at the lack of initiative, 
telling the embassy “if there is another incident, all bets are off.” 120 The diverging 
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interests of the two countries, the U.S. still focused on Vietnam while the ROK now 
focused more on home, caused a serious diplomatic rupture.  
Park, enraged over U.S. passivity, threatened to withdraw ROK troops from 
Vietnam. General Westmoreland, who was asking for more troops due to Tet, declared 
the loss of the ROK’s two divisions at this time would be out of the question.121 In order 
to placate Park, Johnson gave the ROK an additional $100 million in military aid, an F-
4E Jet Squadron worth $58 million, and even more preference for business contracting in 
Vietnam, where South Korea now accounted for over half of all foreign civilians 
operating business.122 Here again, ROKG used their bargaining chip, troops in Vietnam, 
to leverage even more national defense assets.  Despite the concessions, tensions 
remained high. 
U.S./ROK relations entered a phase of steep decline. The ROK grew increasingly 
suspicious that the U.S. was not seriously concerned with the ROK’s security and became 
equally concerned over “loose talk about [U.S.] pulling back some forces from Vietnam” 
and abandoning the cause that the ROK had just joined in full force.123 Dean Rusk 
lamented “the one thing which is not tolerable back here is their [ROK’s] suspicion about 
our basic motives and purposes.” He recounted the long history of U.S. lives, aid, and 
support given to the ROK since the Korean War and found their present mistrust 
“incomprehensible to the American people.”  Rusk further stated:  
We do not expect the Republic of Korea to be a satellite of the United States nor 
do we expect the United States to be a satellite of Korea. We have elementary and 
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basic common interests and the United States has done its full share in supporting 
these common interests. We expect no less from the Koreans.124 
Rusk’s comments affirmed the “common interests” of anti-communism between the USG 
and ROKG. However, the two countries’ common interests were beginning to diverge. 
ROKG always had its eye on North Korea. Participating in Vietnam was a means towards 
surpassing and deterring their rival. After the 1968 provocations, ROKG felt side-lined 
and was losing patience with the lack of USG response towards overt North Korean 
actions. The USG had no interest in direct retaliation towards North Korea for fearing of 
escalating another large-scale war concurrent with Vietnam. 
General Bonesteel was gravely concerned of restarting a new Korean War. He 
called the ROKG an “orgy of emotionalism.”125 Bonesteel further referenced the Park 
administration as a “Mad Hatter’s tea party atmosphere” and Park’s “apres moi le 
deluge”126 attitude. These characterizations suggested a dire and unstable ROKG that 
could escalate a new Korean War at any given moment, putting the U.S. in a precarious 
position. With the Vietnam War losing support at home in the U.S., starting another war 
in Korea would have been unthinkable. Bonesteel, sympathetic to the ROKG’s situation, 
advised his superiors: “I wish to state frankly that we have given him [Park] no real idea 
of what we intend to do or alternative courses, and so I believe we have brought large 
part of it on ourselves.” South Koreans now accused the U.S. of being a “silken fist in a 
silken glove,” meaning they were not the Cold War super-power that they appeared to 
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be.127 The lack of U.S. response to North Korea was unacceptable to the ROKG, who 
saw U.S. as hanging them out to dry in their hour of need. USG and ROKG interests 
became misaligned. 
President Johnson attempted to cool the tensions of the 1968 rupture. Johnson 
dispatched Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance as his personal envoy to salvage 
the deteriorating situation. Vance found Park highly despondent, increasingly turning to 
alcoholism and even domestic violence (he threw an ash tray at his wife). While Vance 
was successful in dissuading Park from invading the North, relations suffered greatly. 
Upon his return, Vance reported “the depth of feeling is very deep…a loss of face,” over 
the lack of U.S. response to the Pueblo incident, that South Korea directly blames the 
U.S. and there was a “strong danger of unilateral action” by the ROKG. 128 The 
conversation lamented on the declining relations between the two countries. Vance 
reported that Park was determined to retaliate and unconcerned about widening the 
conflict. Vance relayed: “Pak is convinced that the North Koreans are going to try to take 
over South Korea by 1970. He said that if they tried to attack Blue House again that he 
would retaliate and that much blood would be shed and that there would be much pain 
and suffering.”129  
 While USG and ROKG common interests appeared to be falling out of alignment, 
a direct consequence of the “Second Korean War” hostilities firmly tied the ROK to 
 
127 Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in 
Chief, Pacific (Sharp), Seoul, February 9, 1968, FRUS Korea 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1. 
128 Folder, "February 15, 1968 - 6:06 p.m. Cyrus Vance meeting on his return from Korea - and other 





Vietnam. By 1968, the United States would not allow South Korea to withdraw its troops 
from Vietnam without severe consequences. This was an urgent point in a conference 
with LBJ and his advisors: 
Clark Clifford [Secretary of Defense]: Did you get any threat at all, even a veiled 
threat, about withdrawing [ROK] troops from South Vietnam?  
Mr. Vance [Deputy Secretary of Defense]: The [ROK] Prime Minister mentioned 
that the legislature might ask for that. I told him very bluntly that we would 
remove our troops from South Korea if that happened. The Prime Minister turned 
ashen. It really shook him.  
Clark Clifford: Then you think they are clear on that?  
Mr. Vance: Yes.130 
Following the Tet offensive, the U.S. war effort in Vietnam was losing all semblance of 
public support at home. The prospect of the ROK withdrawing their 50,000 troops was 
militarily unacceptable. Rusk put it bluntly: “We cannot entertain suspicions about the 
loyalty of the United States to its alliances at a time when we have just lost 900 killed in a 
ten-day period in Viet-Nam.”131 Simultaneously, the U.S. was terrified that the ROK 
would re-initiate hostilities with the North unilaterally and entangle the U.S. in another 
war. Clark Clifford called Park a “weak reed we are leaning on” and that the U.S. must 
“disengage ourselves from any possibility of unilateral action.”132  
Of course, it was the ROKG that was now “entangled” with the USG. If the 
ROKG removed their troops from Vietnam, then the USG would withdraw from South 
Korea, precisely what North Korea hoped to accomplish. This put the ROKG in an 
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equally delicate position. According to the U.S. embassy, when Prime Minister Chung 
heard this news, he “gasped, sputtered and immediately went out” to inform the 
President’s Chief of Staff.133 Mistrust between the two abounded, yet U.S. and ROK fates 
were now sealed for the duration of the Vietnam War. Through a twisted series of events, 
the ROK military in Vietnam was now directly supporting national defense at home in 
South Korea, as their presence abroad kept U.S. defense commitments at home in Korea. 
While the events of “The Second Korean War” severely tested and damaged 
U.S./ROK relations, they also linked the fates of the U.S./ROK military partnership in 
Vietnam for the long haul. Despite declining relations, the U.S. continued to press for 
more ROK troops in Vietnam as late as March 1968. ROK Prime Minister Il Kwon 
Chung responded favorably; he postulated sending another two divisions and stated, “an 
American victory in Vietnam is a victory for Korea, and an American defeat in Vietnam a 
defeat for the ROK.”134 However, Park turned down the proposal, saying “it would be 
impossible” considering South Korea’s current situation, but afterwards Park still floated 
the idea of sending more civilian support. Furthermore, Park advocated for removing all 
restrictions against enemy targets in North Vietnam. He envisioned himself taking up a 
greater role in the war’s direction. He attended the Honolulu Conference in 1968 and 
continuously advocated for the ROKG to be represented in any diplomatic negotiations 
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regarding Vietnam.135 The ROKG still saw a national interest and their national prestige 
tied to winning the Vietnam War. 
However, a final setback in future ROK commitments came when President 
Johnson announced he would not run for a second term. Park was particularly shaken by 
this, as the two had a close and warm relationship. Walt Rostow relayed to Johnson after 
Park heard the news: “Park has shown great unhappiness over your [Johnson’s] personal 
decision and has even expressed the feeling that he should have been consulted, as an old 
and true friend. Above all, he fears that without your leadership the US may abandon the 
Asian policies it has been following.”136 Park’s fears ultimately came to fruition in the 
Nixon administration. However, the ROK military commitment to Vietnam never 
wavered. By this point, ROKG clearly saw its fate as linked to the U.S. war effort. Park 
feared that in the event of a defeat in Vietnam and U.S. withdrawal from the region, 
South Korea would be the next Cold War battleground once again. He had plenty of 
evidence of this already in front of him through North Korea’s latest provocations. 137  
 In summation, events on the Korean peninsula were intricately connected to the 
Vietnam War that gave the ROKG a legitimate national interest. North and South Korea 
each had a unique position and agenda in their role during this period. North Korea 
sought to exploit a window of opportunity to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the 
ROK and probe a communist reunification of Korea. To an extent, North Korea was 
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successful in their first goal; U.S./ROK relations were put to the test and strained by the 
1968 rupture. However, it also forced South Korea to link its future to the U.S. war in 
Vietnam. They could not withdraw their troops without significant consequences. Many 
observers could use this evidence to argue in favor the mercenary narrative, that the USG 
was exerting pressure on the ROKG to retain their Vietnam commitment. While this is 
true, the ROKG also saw their fortunes tied to the outcome of the Vietnam War and 
perceived a real danger in a U.S. defeat and withdrawal from the region. Pending a 
communist victory, the ROKG saw themselves as the next Vietnam, with a very real 
North Korean threat beating down their door. In addition to U.S. pressure, the ROKG 
stayed committed to winning the war in Vietnam through their own interest as a national 
actor. 
 Was this national interest convincing enough for the ROK military to escape the 
“mercenary” label? The next chapter will focus on the ROK military in Vietnam to 
examine the relationship between U.S. and ROK forces and the ROK’s military 
performance. A topic often neglected in most historians’ accounts, a close analysis of the 
ROK troops themselves can provide further insights regarding the mercenary debate and 
uncovering the significance of the ROK’s contribution to the Vietnam War. 
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Chapter 3: Allies or Mercenaries? The ROK Military in Vietnam 
 
“The success ROK forces have enjoyed in Vietnam has been remarkable, but not 
well publicized nor understood.”138 
– Major Ronald R. Rasmussen, U.S. Army, January 1968 
 
Just one hour before midnight on August 9, 1966, a Republic of Korea Army 
(ROKA) Officer of the 9th Company, 1st Cavalry Regiment, heard digging outside his 
defensive perimeter at Landing Zone Twenty-Seven Victor, Pleiku Province. The Korean 
officer relayed his suspicions of enemy movement to the American tank commander of a 
U.S. platoon temporarily under Korean operational control for this mission. The tank 
shined its searchlight on the area along with reconnoitering machine gun fire. Suddenly, a 
North Vietnamese Army battalion burst into a violent attack on the ROKA position. Over 
a six-hour battle, repeated waves of North Vietnamese soldiers attacked from all 
directions with support from recoilless rifles, mortars, and rockets. Korean infantry and 
American tanks working together fiercely defended the assault into the early morning 
hours of the following day. A single North Vietnamese soldier penetrated the ROKA’s 
perimeter, only to be quickly eliminated by a Korean bayonet. When the sun rose the next 
morning, it became clear that the enemy battalion was decimated with nearly 200 
casualties, while the ROKA and U.S. soldiers suffered only 7 casualties themselves. Two 
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years later, President Johnson awarded both the Korean and American units involved the 
Presidential Unit Citation, the highest military award any unit can achieve.139 
To this point, this thesis has argued that ROKG national interests led them to 
contribute to the Vietnam War. Chapter 1 argued that President Park’s need for political 
stability was the primary motivation which allowed ROK troops to become political 
leverage to gain national security and economic concessions. Chapter 2 showed that these 
concessions were a dire necessity, as South Korea faced the prospect of a renewed 
Korean War at home against its rival, North Korea, that began to shift its interests out of 
alignment with USG. Chapter 3 offers new information on the rarely studied Korean 
military effort in Vietnam itself to see if any insight can be gained on the proper 
characterization of ROK forces and the extent of their contribution. How can one define 
the relationship between the U.S. and ROK militaries and how effective was the ROK 
military in Vietnam?  
The ROKA’s relationship to the U.S. military and their degree of effectiveness 
tied back to ROKG’s national interests. The ROKA intentionally sought out an 
independent and autonomous command relationship to the U.S. Army, with an eye on 
avoiding the mercenary appearance and upholding national prestige. In the war’s early 
years (1965-1968, the “honeymoon” period under President Johnson) when USG and 
ROKG were most aligned, the ROKA’s performance appeared at its peak in effectiveness 
and operational significance. In the eyes of U.S. commanders, the ROKA’s performance 
noticeably declined in the war’s later years (1969-1973, under President Nixon) which 
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matches the timeframe when USG and ROKG interests fell out of alignment. By 1969, 
the USG began looking for a way to end the Vietnam War and drawdown U.S. military 
presence in Asia, while ROKG was more concerned than ever about a hostile North 
Korea and sought to retain U.S. defense commitments. The ROKA’s military 
performance in Vietnam was best characterized as a self-directed, national force, whose 
level of effort paralleled the ROKG’s level of shared interest with USG.  
 
Defining the Relationship 
How should a historian, or indeed the American public at large, characterize the ROK 
military in Vietnam? Were they mercenaries? The U.S. paid 100% of all costs related to 
their deployments. If that alone makes them mercenaries, as some scholars argue, then 
the discussion is over. But there is a counter argument. ROK soldiers represented the 
South Korean nation in the pursuit of South Korean interests. They were allies. Formal 
definitions, the nature of the U.S./ROK military command relationship, and the ROK 
soldiers’ motivations will make this case. 
First, definitions of the nomenclature do not support the mercenary label. Merriam-
Webster defines “mercenary” as “one who serves merely for wages, especially a soldier 
hired into foreign service.” Chapters 1 and 2 have shown the complex geo-political 
events that led South Korea into Vietnam. The ROK soldiers cannot be said to be serving 
only for wages or in foreign service. They served in the Republic of Korea Army 
(ROKA) and Marines, fighting under the South Korean flag, for South Korean leaders, 
for South Korean political interests. Accordingly, Merriam-Webster’s definition of 
“alliance” is more fitting: “an association to further common interests of the members.” 
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140 Again the question of “common interests” is the crux. Previous chapters have shown 
the USG and ROKG interests did align in Vietnam in ways beyond a simple anti-
communism or “domino theory.” The ROKG used Vietnam to gain an edge against its 
rival North Korea, and later saw U.S. defense commitments to Korea as contingent on the 
ROK’s presence in Vietnam. A counterargument would easily suggest “mercenaries” can 
also be “allies,” and therefore the definitions are not exclusive. How else can scholars 
separate the two? 
One supporter of the mercenary narrative points to the Geneva Convention as 
evidence for the ROKA as mercenaries.141 This is simply wrong. The four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 have absolutely no mention of the term “mercenary.”142 In fact, the 
first legal definition of the term “mercenary” did not appear until after the Vietnam War, 
in the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention. Even then, Article 47 defines 
a mercenary as follows: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain and, in fact, is promised by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of 
similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces.143 
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A person must meet all six criteria to be classified as a mercenary by the Geneva 
Convention. With this definition, ROK soldiers in Vietnam cannot be legally defined as 
mercenaries due to conditions d, e, and f. South Korea was formally a party to the 
conflict, and ROK soldiers were officially uniformed members of its armed forces.  
Definitions aside, the term “mercenary” is more often used in a broader sense to 
criticize the ROKG’s motivations for joining the conflict. As Katherine Fallah points out, 
the term “mercenary” is a loaded term to express disapproval of a person’s motivation in 
a political, rather than a legal context.144 That large percentages of the public in both U.S. 
and South Korea condemned their countries’ presence in Vietnam is not in doubt and 
explains the origin and lasting presence of the mercenary label. Going beyond formal 
definitions may be more helpful in arguing for or against the mercenary narrative on a 
rhetorical level.  
 Secondly, the special nature of the U.S./ROK command relationship in Vietnam 
did not support “mercenary” label.  Simply put, ROK units did not fall under direct U.S. 
operational control (OPCON). Instead, they were in control of their own troops. They 
were under no legal authority to obey U.S. orders if they chose not to. According to the 
U.S. Army’s Field Manual 3-16, “The Army in Multinational Operations,” there are four 
possible command structures between partner nations: integrated, lead-nation, 
combination, or parallel.145 In the first three arrangements, partner nations either form a 
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control, or some combination of the two. In the final arrangement, the parallel command, 
partner nations remain separate and independent entities, with no direct command control 
of the other. Notably, the U.S. Army deems a parallel structure as “not the preferred 
structure because of the absence of a single coalition commander and lack of unity of 
command.”146 Thus, it was even more significant that the ROK forces in Vietnam 
(ROKFV) formally had a parallel command structure with U.S. forces, going against 
U.S. doctrinal preferences.    
 The desire to remain formally autonomous and independent was important to the 
ROKG’s national prestige. The ROK military was formally in Vietnam at the request of 
the South Vietnamese government in the larger regional struggle against communism. 
The senior commander for ROKFV, Lieutenant General Chae Myung Shin worked out a 
“gentlemen’s agreement” with U.S. General William Westmoreland, in which a parallel 
command structure would be maintained, but Chae promised to “honor any requests” 
Westmoreland made upon ROKFV. 147 This amounted to a “de facto” OPCON of the 
ROKFV to U.S. commanders, but not officially. The ROK withheld the option to decline 
U.S. orders. The distinction was meaningful, in that Westmoreland had formal OPCON 
of all other partner nations yet LTG Chae explicitly refused the arrangement when 
Westmoreland raised the question.148 The OPCON issue even came up in 
communications with President Johnson, who once asked Rostow to direct Cyrus Vance 
to “request Korean permission for Westy [Westmoreland] to redeploy Korean forces if 
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necessary,” a power that Westmoreland did not have. 149 ROKFV clung to their own 
operational autonomy. 
 Video evidence taken by the U.S. Signal Corps offered further clues that support 
the nature of ROKFV’s autonomy and presence as a separate, national actor. ROKFV had 
control in their own bases and their own area of operations. In the images below, notice 
the chain of command bulletin board, a visual display of the hierarchy of authority in 
military units, appears to show Park Chung Hee at the top, not American generals (on all 
American military chain of command boards, the U.S. president is always at the top). 
Park was the ROKA Commander in Chief. Furthermore, notice the nature of the ROK 
national flag; it is to the right of the American flag, signaling a higher place of honor (in 
U.S. military tradition, the American Flag is always the right-most flag in ceremonies). In 
some instances, the American Flag is not even present at all. Lastly, notice the ROKA 
conducting their own independent war gaming with their own terrain model of the 
battlefield. That they conducted their own independent planning, rather than taking all 
orders from Americans, further shows their autonomy. 
 
149 Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Korean Task Force (Brown) to Secretary of State 




Three flags flew over the Tiger Division’s HQ – ROK, RVN, U.S. Notice the ROK Flag 
is flying highest and on the right-most side (Flag’s POV), in military tradition, the place 
of honor. September 25, 1968. 
Two soldiers tour the Tiger Division’s war museum in Vietnam. This appears to be a 
military Chain of Command board showing Park Chung Hee on top as Commander in 
Chief. September 1, 1968. 
 Source: Film Reel – ROK ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM (TIGER INFANTRY 
DIVISION), Motion Picture Films from the Army Library Copy Collection, 1964 – 
1980, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 – 1985, RG 111, National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) https://catalog.archives.gov/id/32157,  
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/32159  (accessed October 1, 2020). 
Figure 1 - Flags Over Tiger Division HQ 





This evidence shows the Tiger Division conducting its own independent military planning in its area 
of operations. Notice again what appears to be a Park Chung Hee portrait, the Korean national flag, 
and the absence of an American Flag. September 1, 1968. Source: Film Reel – ROK ACTIVITIES IN 
VIETNAM (TIGER INFANTRY DIVISION), https://catalog.archives.gov/id/32157  (accessed 
October 2, 2020). 
 




Supporters of the mercenary narrative would counter that the parallel command 
structure was on paper only. Operationally, ROKFV fell under the U.S. I Field Force. 
Indeed, ROKFV was heavily embedded within U.S. planning. As the ROK’s ranking 
representative in Vietnam, LTG Chae established a ROKA Corps level headquarters in 
Saigon and desired to be seen on equal terms with other commanders of his rank.150 
ROKFV headquarters was only a quarter mile down the road from the I Field Force HQ. 
151 ROKA Officers did not serve on a combined staff with Americans, but instead 
functioned through liaison officers that met four to five times a week for intelligence 
sharing, staff meetings, and planning. The commander of I Field Force, LTG Stanley 
Larsen, recalled that planning with Koreans was very smooth and well-coordinated.152 
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) delimited ROKFV’s area of operations 
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Figure 6 - ROKA Ceremony at Qui Nhon 
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and overall, big picture, mission goals. Realistically, ROKFV was one spoke in the wheel 
to MACV’s larger picture. However, a “gentlemen’s agreement” to honor requests is not 
the same thing as operational control. It is also worth noting that all other U.S. allies 
(Thailand, The Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand) did fall under direct U.S. 
command and control.153 ROKFV, while highly embedded and coordinating with 
MACV, was not subject to direct orders from Westmoreland, Larsen, or any other 
American officer. Within their own area of operations, ROKFV had their own bases, 
planned their own unit missions, and called their own shots.  
Turning to the final point of contention, the mercenary argument gives primacy to 
the financial compensation as the ROK soldiers’ motivation. The U.S. paid ROK soldiers 
$37.50 monthly, a rate twenty-three times higher than a ROK soldier made in Korea 
($1.60 monthly).154 This was considerably cheaper than the U.S. paid their own soldiers. 
A ROK soldier in Vietnam earned between $5,000 and $7,800 per year, while a U.S. 
soldier in Vietnam averaged around $13,000 a year.155 Furthermore, the majority of 
ROKFV consisted of volunteers (upwards of 60%), leading many outside observers to 
conclude financial motives were paramount. However, the motivations for individual 
soldiers to serve in Vietnam were complex and multi-faceted, such that financial payment 
alone cannot explain the high numbers of ROK volunteers.156 
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The average South Korean soldier had several motives for volunteering in 
Vietnam. Finances were important but not out of a selfish or lucrative pursuit. Since the 
Korean War, South Korea faced tremendous poverty. The average family earned the 
equivalent of about 34 U.S. dollars monthly in 1965.157 Through volunteering, ROK 
soldiers found a chance to aid their families in alleviating poverty and fulfill their 
breadwinner roles. The average soldier remitted 80% of his earnings back to his 
family.158 Additionally, South Korean men placed tremendous esteem in military service 
as a means to fulfill one’s masculinity; one veteran remembered “Men must fight in war, 
that’s how we become men…I was excited at the thought of war.”159 Furthermore, Park 
initiated a massive national public relations campaign to support the war effort, including 
elaborate send-off ceremonies where women and children cheered on the departing 
soldiers. Park wanted the public to view the war as a means for South Korea to regain 
international prestige, fight off the communist threat, and repay a debt of honor to the 
U.S. from their intervention during the Korean War.160 Han Ki-sun, a South Korean pilot, 
remembered “At the time it was the most valuable contribution a healthy man could offer 
to the country.”161 National pride, a sense of masculine honor and duty, and taking care 
of one’s family were paramount.  
Considering definitions of nomenclature, the nature of the ROKFV’s command 
relationship to MACV, and the individual ROK soldier’s motivations, the ROK soldiers 
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in Vietnam deserved better than a pejorative mercenary label. They fought for their 
country, South Korea. To take matters further, they fought very well. They were not a 
token presence merely for the sake of international legitimacy. ROKFV’s contribution to 
the war effort in Vietnam was considerable. Although they did much to aid the U.S., their 
efforts also caused controversy over alleged human rights abuses that would leave a 
conflicted record of service.  
 
Helping or Hurting: Military Assessment 
Republic of Korea Forces Vietnam (ROKFV) effectively assisted the U.S. war 
effort. The original presence of the Dove Unit alone in 1964 would have sufficed for 
Johnson’s goal of international recognition; thus, the requesting of actual combat troops 
reflected a real necessity. In the war’s early years (1965-1968) U.S. military leaders and 
politicians spoke favorably of ROKFV’s performance and notably bestowed many 
accolades to ROK servicemembers. Despite the mostly positive assessment, this 
impression declined over time, paralleling the war’s lack of progress and shifting USG 
and ROKG interests. Lastly, ROKFV was allegedly involved in human rights abuse 
scandals that scarred the memory of their service. Despite these controversies, ROKFV’s 
overall contribution to the U.S. war effort furthered U.S. military objectives, and they 
made a strong case study for the use of U.S. military allies in regional conflicts.  
From a purely military perspective, the ROK contribution to Vietnam was 
operationally significant. ROKFV assumed control of a 280-mile coastal area from Phu 
Cat Mountain to Phang Rang, an area with one million Vietnamese civilian residents.162 
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ROKFV’s presence directly relieved U.S. units from these positions and allowed them to 
assume a more offensive posture along the Laos and Cambodia border regions. The 
standing 50,000 ROKFV directly translated to a one for one substitute; U.S. commanders 
stated at the time that if the ROK did not send a division, an American division would 
have to go in its place. 163 This saved 50,000 Americans from the unpopular draft back 
home. Furthermore, ROKFV engaged in numerous combat operations including 
successful joint operations with U.S. forces.  
ROKFV and the U.S. military conducted multiple joint operations during the 
Vietnam War that demonstrated the partnership’s success. The most well-known joint 
operation was “Operation Paul Revere II” and the Battle of Landing Zone 27 Victor (the 
opening anecdote of this chapter). Uniquely, in this specific instance, a ROKA infantry 
company had tactical control (TACON) of a U.S. tank platoon (the ROK company 
commander was temporarily in command of U.S. soldiers). Through a coordinated effort 
involving ROK Infantry, U.S. tanks, and combined ROK and U.S. artillery, the ROK and 
U.S. forces won the six-hour battle. 164 The combined force killed 197 NVA soldiers, 
while losing only 7 ROK soldiers and no American casualties. The U.S. tank platoon 
reportedly had “endless praise” for the Korean unit.165 
 A second highlight, Operation Irving was another successful joint 
U.S./ROK/ARVN endeavor. From September to October 1966, the U.S. 1st Cavalry 
Division, ROK Capital Division, and ARVN 22nd Division conducted joint operations to 
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clear the NVA 3rd Division out of the Phu Cat Mountains. The ROK Division acted as an 
“anvil,” in their role to clear the mountains and block southern retreat routes. The U.S. 1st 
CAV acted as the “hammer” and led the main attack. Together, U.S., ROK, and ARVN 
forces achieved success in forcing the NVA to retreat and lose critical logistical bases, 
including enemy casualties numbering 2,063 killed and 1,409 captured. Of these, the 
ROKA unit reportedly killed 1,161 enemy, while losing only 30 ROKA soldiers. 166 U.S. 
General Stanley Larsen recalled the ROKA’s performance was “extraordinarily thorough 
and effective.”167 The operation was an overwhelming success and demonstrated the 
capabilities of multinational operations.  
 Beyond joint operations, ROKFV was successful through independent operations 
without direct U.S. assistance. ROKFV actively patrolled its area of operations daily, 
seeking out the enemy and denying NVA and VC freedom of movement. As a sample, 
the ROKFV G-3 (Operations Officer) reported highly successful statistics during the 3rd 
Quarter 1969 report to the Combined Campaign Plan. The ROKFV G-3 reported 43 
battalion size operations, 6 regimental size operations, and over 459 total battalion 
maneuver days. ROKFV engaged in 232 contacts with the enemy, resulting in 1,327 
KIA, 19 prisoners, and captured 608 small arms weapons and 25 crew-served 
weapons.168 These statistics were enough to impress top U.S. Generals who commended 
the Koreans. General William Peers, a subsequent commander of I Field Force, remarked 
that Korean operations were a “fine state of art” for their “phenomenal” kill ratios, 
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reaching as high as 100 to 1, and a higher rate of capturing enemy weapons compared to 
U.S. soldiers.169 General Larsen similarly commented: “Every time the Koreans 
performed a mission, they did it well.”170 In 1975, Larsen wrote a historical study on the 
Army’s use of allied forces in which he unequivocally praised ROKFV: “The Koreans, 
who asked for very little credit, have received almost no recognition in the U.S. press and 
it is doubtful if many Americans fully appreciate their contributions in South 
Vietnam.”171 Other U.S. observers had the same impression. 
 Another outspoken supporter of ROKFV’s performance was Major Ronald R. 
Rasmussen, a U.S. Army officer who worked in I Field Force in Vietnam and directly 
observed ROKFV in action. He praised them in a 1968 Military Review article: 
The key to the Korean’s success is the individual ROK soldier. He is undoubtedly 
one of the best soldiers in the Free World. Tough, aggressive, well disciplined, 
patient, persistent, and thorough, he keeps his equipment in top condition and 
responds almost instinctively to orders and instructions. One veteran US officer, 
who has served with US infantry units in three conflicts, called him “the epitome 
of a soldier, almost faultless.”172 
Rasmussen went on to highlight the ROK’s success characterized by aggressive 
patrolling operations, a “sister program” of securing strategic hamlets, and emphasizing 
civil affairs with the Vietnamese populace. 173 ROKFV’s contribution extended beyond 
combat operations. 
In addition to their combat prowess, ROKFV aided humanitarian efforts as well. 
ROKFV held sporting events, taekwondo demonstrations, and community feasts to win 
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local support.174 In 1970, ROK officers requested special funds for construction projects 
at Ninh An Village, a request that pleasantly surprised U.S. officers who called it 
“commendable” and commented that ROK “engineering expertise should certainly be 
exploited.”175 The ROKFV’s “Dove Unit” of engineers and medical personnel treated 
30,000 patients, constructed 3 bridges, 4 schools, 2 dispensaries, and 2 hamlet offices.176 
U.S. Signal Corps video footage (below) recorded ROK units engaged in wider 
humanitarian efforts such as housing construction, building an agricultural center and an 
orphanage, and hosting taekwondo instruction to ARVN soldiers. This is significant in 
showing the impact of a U.S. ally going far beyond token, rhetorical support, but instead 
contributing both military and nonmilitary aid that had a noticeable impact, at least in the 
eyes of U.S. commanders. 
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 Early in the war, Americans openly applauded and awarded ROKFV’s efforts in 
Vietnam with numerous accolades. In a conference with ROK Prime Minister Chung Il 
Kwon, President Johnson relayed that General Westmoreland believed “there are no finer 
fighting men in Viet-Nam than the Korean troops there,” and told him to “tell the mothers 
of these fine boys just how proud we all are…”.177 The U.S. Defense Department 
awarded ROK Defense Minister Kim Sung Eun the Legion of Merit decoration.178 LTG 
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Creighton Abrams personally attended and spoke at a ROKA award ceremony in 
Vietnam in 1968. LTG Abrams awarded the Bronze Star Medal to about a dozen ROKA 
soldiers. Most prestigiously of all, LTG Abrams presented the Presidential Unit Citation 
(the highest possible unit award) to the ROKA’s 9th Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Cavalry 
Regiment, Capital Division. Evidently, Americans strongly valued the ROK contribution, 
at least in the war’s early years. This impression would not last through to the Nixon 
administration as the war effort became increasingly strained and USG and ROKG 





Despite the praise and awards early in the war, the U.S. assessment of ROK 
forces declined over time, paralleling changing priorities of both USG and ROKG 
national interests. By 1971, with the new Nixon administration committed to ending the 
war and reducing U.S. presence in Asia, the war effort sank further into a quagmire. 
American opinion of ROK forces appeared to sink along with it. In a memo debating how 
best to withdraw U.S. and ROK troops from Vietnam, Henry Kissinger advised President 
(Top-Left) – LTG Abrams awards the Bronze Star Medal to ROKA soldiers. (Top-Right) LTG Abrams awards the Presidential Unit 
Citation to ROKA Unit. (Bottom-Left) LTG Abrams and LTG Chae presiding over the award ceremony. (Bottom-Right) ROKA troops 
in formation at award ceremony. September 25, 1968. Source: Film Reel – ROK ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM (TIGER INFANTRY 
DIVISION), https://catalog.archives.gov/id/32159 (accessed  October 1, 2020). 
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Nixon that “almost all observers agree that the ROKFV are not now being used to 
greatest advantage.” Kissinger stated: “Initially very effective in combat…they have 
appeared reluctant to undertake offensive operations.”179 Rumors circulated among U.S. 
Generals that ROKFV was now operating on secret instructions from Seoul to minimize 
casualties by reducing operations.180 By 1971, even LTG Abrams reportedly said the 
ROK’s “were not pulling their weight.”181 Subsequent commanders of I Field Force 
similarly held criticism. General Arthur Collins said the entire ROKFV was the 
equivalent of “one good U.S. Brigade,” and General Charles Brown criticized the 
Koreans for spending too much time planning and not enough time executing 
operations.182   
Why did U.S. Generals’ opinion of the Koreans turn sour as the war stagnated? 
General Larsen postulated in hindsight that the quality of Korean volunteers may have 
declined as the war dragged on, and he also acknowledged a suspicion of instructions 
from Park to LTG Chae regarding toning down offensive operations to prevent 
casualties.183 Such a negative military assessment was not totally surprising considering 
the abysmal progress of the Vietnam War in general by the 1970’s. After all, Kissinger 
was already speaking in the context of how best to disengage from Vietnam entirely, so 
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why should ROKFV be concerned with increasing their operational risk if the end 
appeared in sight?  
On a deeper level, part of the answer related to national interests of two countries 
changing and falling out of alignment. From the USG side, the Nixon administration was 
openly pursuing a means to end the war and withdraw U.S. presence in Asia, especially 
after the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 (discussed in Chapter 4) which 
was unwelcome news to Park. This did not match ROKG interests, who sought to retain 
U.S. presence in Asia to ward off North Korea. Ending the war in an ambiguous defeat 
would also propose a challenge to ROKG national prestige, end their massive economic 
investments in Vietnam, and raised the question of U.S. abandonment in Korea. This 
misalignment of interests manifested in ROKFV’s level of effort and paralleled the 
overall declining U.S./ROK relations. Regardless, the most damaging and egregious 
accusations towards ROKFV’s conduct did not come from U.S. politicians or generals, 
but from the press and the Vietnamese populace. 
ROKFV faced numerous allegations of civilian massacres and human rights 
abuses that damaged the memory of their service. The list included massacres at Ha My, 
Binh An, Vinh Xuan, An Linh, Phu Yen, and more. Investigator A. Terry Rambo 
interviewed South Vietnamese refugees in 1966 in which he discovered accusations of 
ROK soldiers murdering “hundreds” of South Vietnamese civilians. Allegedly, Koreans 
were “shooting people at random” and had “a deliberate systematic policy” of killing 
civilians. 184 In February 1968, Korean soldiers allegedly killed 135 civilians in a 
massacre at Ha My. According to a recent New York Times article, South Vietnamese 
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residents still tell ghost stories about a South Korean soldier who haunts the village.185 At 
Binh An, ROK soldiers allegedly massacred 1,004 civilians over a three-week period; 
Vietnam recently memorialized the event with South Korean representatives at a 50th 
anniversary in 2016.186 South Vietnamese witnesses still living today attest to South 
Korean atrocities against women and children all over the ROKFV area of operations. 
One witness, Bui Thanh Tram said: “Meeting a Korean was like meeting death…they 
shot anyone they saw.”187 
These allegations could not possibly have been unknown to U.S. officials. During 
the negotiations of requesting subsequent ROK deployments, one State Department 
communication to Dean Rusk included the following critique of ROK forces as a 
disadvantage: “The style of ROK operations in Viet-Nam is such (i.e., virtually to take 
over the government of the areas in which they operate) that doubling the size of the 
ROK forces might have a significant adverse effect on Vietnamese attitudes.”188 When 
investigator A. Terry Rambo briefed his findings of abuses to U.S. senior military 
officers, they responded with a gag order for him to “cease investigating the Koreans.”189 
Video footage from the U.S. Signal Corps (below), while certainly not showing any 
atrocities, does reveal that ROKFV unilaterally carried out their own prison operations, 
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interrogations, and took women and children captive. ROKFV was at liberty to deal with 
prisoners however they saw fit.  
Human rights abuse allegations left a lasting scar on the memory of the ROKFV’s 
service. This alone may likely be a large factor for explaining why the modern-day 
memory of ROK participation in Vietnam is easily forgotten by the U.S. or ROK public 
at large, and why some may prefer it be forgotten. Sadly, these allegations also gave 
ROKFV another element in common with U.S. forces, who faced their own share of 
scandals and abuse allegations, most famously at My Lai. Ultimately, ROKFV followed 
U.S. guidance in controlling their area of operations and prosecuting a war where success 
was measured by a body count. The horrors of the Vietnam War led to devastation and 
lasting controversies that add to a tumultuous and conflicted memory, something South 








(Top Left) Women’s and children compound sign. (Top Right) 
Women and children in a prison compound. (Mid Left) The 
ROKA POW collection point, front entrance. (Mid Right) 
Vietnamese POW’s. (Bottom Left) ROKA interrogating a 
prisoner. September 26, 1968. Source: Film Reel – ROK 
ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM (TIGER INFANTRY 
DIVISION), https://catalog.archives.gov/id/32158,  
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/32160 (accessed October 1, 
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Figure 13 - ROKA Prisoner Operations 
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A final assessment of the U.S./ROK military alliance leaves a mixed record, but 
ROKFV’s contribution was militarily significant. ROKFV was not a mercenary force, 
nor was it a token force. The sheer fact that the Johnson administration was so keen to 
continuously request more and more ROK troops up until 1968 shows an implicit value 
in the ROK’s presence. In the war’s initial years, when national interests were most 
aligned, U.S. favorably praised ROKFV’s contribution. This assessment declined 
overtime as the war stagnated, and national interests changed. Still, ROKFV remained in 
Vietnam until the war’s end, finally withdrawing in 1973. The aftermath that immediately 
followed saw U.S./ROK relations decline to a new low, as the U.S. sought to reduce its 
presence in Asia and the ROKG became even more authoritarian in nature. The results 




Chapter 4: Aftermath and Memory 
“At the Vietnam War, I joined as a soldier and came home as a mercenary.”190 
-Line from South Korean film White Badge (1992) 
 
 Ahmet Ozbuden, the Principal Secretary for the United Nations Commission for 
the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), reflected on the news of the 
ROK’s withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. Ozbuden called the ROK’s participation a 
“Democles [sic] Sword,” a reference to Cicero’s legend of Dionysius and Damocles in 
which a sword hangs by a single strand of hair suspended from the ceiling. 191 The 
parable’s moral implied the shadow of impending doom hangs over those in positions of 
great power and fortune.192 This would become the fate of Park Chung Hee, who 
following Vietnam doubled down on his authoritarian dictatorship through his Yushin 
constitution and ultimately met his own untimely death.  
USG and ROKG interests were mostly aligned during the Johnson administration, 
but they increasingly diverged after 1969. After Johnson, subsequent U.S. presidents 
from Nixon to Carter sought to withdraw U.S. troops from USFK and politically distance 
themselves from Park’s ethically questionable human rights record. U.S./ROK relations 
declined sharply in the 1970’s with both countries changing directions and questioning 
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their purpose in Vietnam. The downward slide left both countries eager to forget their 
eight-year military alliance.  
Transitioning from the top-down approach of government perceptions, the end of 
the Vietnam War brought an embattled memory to both country’s public memory on a 
more personal level. For the U.S., the story is well known as Americans had long since 
questioned and challenged their presence in Vietnam via a vigorous anti-war protest 
campaign. For South Korea, however, domestic opposition to Vietnam was largely 
silenced at the time. In the ROK, the use of the word “mercenary” could lead to one’s 
arrest.193 Yet, statistically, South Korea benefited enormously from their participation, 
although it came with the price tag of authoritarianism and political repression at home. 
Even after the war, the economic component remained a sticking point. Popular films 
show South Korea struggling to rationalize its economic benefits from such a seemingly 
regrettable war. The question of national interests, “Why are we in Vietnam?” became a 
difficult and uncomfortable question for both U.S. and ROK society and left the Korean 
contribution buried in popular memory.  
 
After the War 
The Vietnam War’s aftermath changed USG strategic priorities and national 
interests. Historian Daniel Sargent argues that America’s global presence in the 1970’s 
transformed in a chaotic manner as it faced new challenges of détente, globalization, 
stagflation, and shifted the locus of U.S. military power out of Southeast Asia.194 
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Katharine Moon similarly argues that the Nixon Doctrine shocked the ROK, removed 
their leverage from Vietnam participation, and left the ROKG “grasping at straws” for 
national security.195 Taking a starkly different stance from his predecessor, President 
Nixon and his chief advisor Henry Kissinger pursued realpolitik and disengagement from 
unnecessary commitments. Before the Vietnam War even concluded, the U.S. already 
began this process under the Nixon Doctrine in 1969.  
If U.S./ROK relations were strained in 1968, the 1969 Nixon Doctrine took it 
down to yet another low. On July 24, 1969, Nixon declared the U.S. would begin 
withdrawing its military presence and commitments in Asia. Nixon told reporters in 
Guam: “Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated 
to from the outside, Asia for the Asians. And that is what we want, and that is the role we 
should play. We should assist, but we should not dictate.”196 Nixon planned to get the 
U.S. totally out of Vietnam and other regional entanglements in Asia, including Korea. In 
1970, the U.S. withdrew the 7th Infantry Division (ID), over 20,000 soldiers, from the 
ROK. Nixon, and later Carter, slashed aid funding to the ROK from $546.7 million in 
1966-1971, to $12.million in 1971-1978, and decreased the Military Assistance Program 
(MAP) down to nothing by 1978.197 U.S. détente with the USSR and recognition of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 added to the ROKG’s concern of 
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abandonment.198 These moves towards disengagement occurred during the ROK 
military’s redeployment from Vietnam.  
The ROK military’s homecoming occurred slowly and revealed that international 
opinion held a mostly negative view of the ROK’s Vietnam participation. The first 
announcement of a “step by step” withdrawal came on January 14, 1971. In 1973, the 
final year of the war, there were still 38,000 ROK troops in Vietnam, outnumbering U.S. 
soldiers. UNCURK’s commentary on the end of the ROK’s role in Vietnam largely 
disapproved of the ROK’s involvement. Zouheir Kuzbaria, secretary for UNCURK in 
1970 stated that political observers in Korea, “who had always questioned the wisdom” 
of ROK involvement in Vietnam, applauded the decision to diffuse and end the Vietnam 
War.199 His successor, Ahmet Ozbudun, agreed that the international community 
disapproved of the ROK’s involvement, all be it with a more nuanced analysis. He stated 
that ROK troop removals “created mixed feelings in the Press.” Ozbudun claimed “the 
over-all reaction favours the original 1965 decision to despatch [sic] the troops; praises 
the contribution of Korean soldiers to an invaded friend; welcomes generally the decision 
to withdraw; and expresses anxiety for the substantial economic loss that would be 
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inevitably incurred as a result of full withdrawal.” 200 Other positive effects, the combat 
experience of the ROK veterans and their latest battle-tested equipment would aid the 
ROK’s military modernization and presumably increase deterrence against North Korea. 
By 1972, the remaining 38,000 troops planned to return home by December. Despite 
these silver linings, Ozbudun concluded: “The highly negative legacy of ROK forces in 
Viet-Nam thus appears to be coming to an end.”201  
UNCURK observers worried for the ROK’s future in the wake of Vietnam’s 
defeat. The redeployment coincided with a series of momentous challenges to the Park 
regime’s stability: the apparent failure of the war, U.S. removal of the 7th ID from Korea, 
and the PRC joining the UN. The loss of political leverage over the U.S. would leave the 
ROK more destabilized in at time of growing tensions with North Korea. Additionally, 
UNCURK was concerned about the economic loss that had boosted South Korea’s 
economy for eight years, as well as the absorption of the remaining 38,000 soldiers back 
into the economy all in the span of 60 days.202 In a final analysis, Ozbuden alluded to 
international governments’ mixed feelings and embattled interpretations over South 
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Korea’s participation in Vietnam. Ozbudun concluded that the withdrawal ended the “bad 
image intensely suffered by the ROK, even in the eyes of most friendly nations,” and that 
their participation would “leave behind a residue of controversial legacy…in the form of 
bitter historic memory.” 203  
In response to these rapid changes and uncertainties, Park clamped down on his 
own autocratic government in his declaration of the Yushin Constitution in 1972. 
Increasing North Korean aggression, the end of Vietnam, and withdrawal of U.S. troops 
from the ROK all influenced Park’s decision. Park replaced South Korea’s existing 
constitution, became de-facto President for life, and turned South Korea into a garrison 
state.204 The Yushin constitution exacerbated ROKG’s most unethical elements, that 
which came with a terrorizing KCIA, media censorship, human rights abuses, and labor 
exploitation. The ROK’s economic progress gained from Vietnam participation did not 
benefit everyone equally under the Yushin system. 
Park played a very hands-on role in directing who would benefit most from 
Vietnam’s economic opportunities. The largest beneficiaries were Park’s state-supported 
chaebols, the massive Korean conglomerates that gained significant momentum during 
the war. Hanjin, receiving $116 million dollars in contracts, got its start as a future master 
of containerized shipping.205 Vietnam accounted for 77% of Hyundai’s profits from 
1963-1966 through sub-contracts for military housing, the Pattani-Narathiwat Highway 
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(in Thailand), and dredging Cam Ranh Bay.206 In accordance with Park’s drive towards 
HCI (Heavy Chemical Industry), the ROK directed significant capital to creating Pohang 
Iron and Steel (POSCO) in 1968, and within 30 years POSCO would become the world’s 
second largest steel producer.207 These companies persist to the present, and are often 
cited as the building blocks in South Korea’s “miracle on the Han,” although not without 
controversy.  
 The shining economic statistics belie an uglier side of Korean contract work in 
Vietnam. Outsourcing labor to foreign companies saved the U.S. from sending more 
Americans to an increasingly unpopular war, instead exposing foreigners to hazardous 
conditions. The USG cared little about obvious labor exploitation which was widespread 
amongst the contractors. This included oppressive schedules, dangerous conditions, and 
lack of benefits or overtime.208 These observations add to the appearance of South Korea 
making a dark bargain of blood for treasure, offering its young men as collateral for 
economic benefits. 
 It would be a mistake to assume the Vietnam War alone was responsible for South 
Korea’s economic ascent in the 60’s and 70’s. The picture was far more complicated, and 
ridden with what Bruce Cumings called the “dark side” of the Park years.209 In 
recounting South Korea’s economic rise, Cumings offers the following dirty laundry list: 
“…authoritarian constitutions, national police, registration of all citizens, meaningless 
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elections, absence of civil and political rights, many secret police and intelligence groups, 
extremes of torture and thought reform for dissidents, close neighborhood surveillance by 
police and resident families.”210 Vietnam War contracting was not the only controversial 
factor. 
Chief among Park’s “dark side” was labor exploitation, especially women’s labor. 
Young women, primarily from ages 18-22, made up over 80% of South Korea’s textile 
workers, consisting of sewing, knitting, making footwear, packaging, and other tedious 
and mundane tasks. They worked in horrid conditions, had only one day off per month, 
and were paid the equivalent of the price of a cup of coffee per day.211 Additionally, large 
chaebols like Hyundai and Samsung banned labor unions. The Park regime under the 
Yushin system harshly and violently suppressed any attempts at speaking out against the 
abuses of industry. 212 The exploitation of women’s labor was one factor among many of 
South Korea’s economic “take off.” 
 Park’s Yushin system enabled obvious human rights abuses towards the South 
Korean populace and further strained U.S./ROK relations during Jimmy Carter’s 
presidency. Carter, who prioritized human rights in his foreign policy, advocated for the 
complete removal of all U.S. troops in USFK. This initiative stalled, as even those in 
Carter’s own administration opposed it out of security concerns.213 Despite Carter’s 
attempts to pressure Park into domestic reforms, the ROK was no longer dependent on 
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U.S. aid as in the decades prior and was more insulated to U.S. pressure. The ROK’s 
economy tripled in size from 1965 to 1976, and for the first time had surpassed North 
Korea in GNP.214 South Korea was now a rising power on the world stage. 
Park’s economic achievements combined with his authoritarian oppression to 
leave a mixed record in Korean memory. Despite Park’s “dark side,” many South 
Koreans still fondly remember Park as the ROK’s greatest leader. He remains South 
Korea’s most popular president, receiving over 70% approval rating in a 1994 poll.215 A 
more recent 2015 poll still has Park in the number one spot, with 44% of South Koreans 
choosing him as the ROK’s best president.216 As time passed, more oppositional voices 
could finally speak out against the abuses of Park’s regime and a younger generation 
could reevaluate his achievements in a new light. Still, others clung to the image of Park 
as a hero. Author Sang Hwa Hong highly praised the Park regime and the Vietnam 
decision for allowing South Korea to reach the “take-off” stage, reaching over 11% 
annual growth, even during the oppressive Yushin administration (1972-1979). 217 Any 
assessment of Park must give credit where credit is due regarding his economic 
achievements. Were these achievements worth the cost of Vietnam participation abroad 
and human rights abuses at home? How one answers that question determines their 
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opinion of Park. Carter Eckert, a historian who lived in South Korea during the Yushin 
period, aptly reminds about Park: “to understand all is not necessarily to forgive all.”218  
 Park died on October 26, 1979. His own director of the KCIA unexpectedly 
assassinated him during a dramatic private dinner. His “Damocles Sword” had finally 
fallen. His legacy, along with his decision to involve South Korea in the Vietnam War 
remained highly controversial and brought lasting effects. South Korea had finally 
surpassed North Korea, both economically and militarily. The ROK’s militarization and 
authoritarianism that solidified and accelerated during the war continued for another 
decade and leaves marks in the present. Notably, South Korea’s next two Presidents, 
Chun Do Hwan and Roe Tae Woo, were both Vietnam War veterans. 219   
 By the 1990’s, South Korea finally achieved a long-sought democratic 
government with legitimate elections and an opening up of political freedom and 
expression. With the passage of time, how would South Koreans look back and 
remember their country’s Vietnam experience? How would it compare to American 
memory? Their eight-year military alliance left many common themes in national 
memory representations, especially concerning the unethical elements of the war and 
struggles of returning veterans. However, the mercenary narrative remained a sticking 
point unique to Korean memory, while the American public forgot Koreans ever 
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A Shared Experience: Popular Memory Through Film  
 
Films are one way to gauge public memory of historical events. In the words of 
one scholar, they are “costume dramas” that reenact the past for the public’s examination 
and reflection.220 Films become historical sources themselves as “artifacts” for points in 
time that influence and reveal a national ideological debate in the making.221 While they 
rarely depict reality with much accuracy, films do reveal how societies remember, 
process, and assimilate historical events into a national story. This is certainly the case in 
American cinema regarding the Vietnam War. Yet, American films do not include the 
slightest acknowledgment of a South Korean presence.222 South Koreans are simply not 
part of the public American Vietnam War story. On the other side, South Korea now has 
a booming film industry of their own. A comparison of U.S. and South Korean films 
reveals that both countries depict shared themes and ideological debates regarding the 
war. These shared themes help to explain why South Koreans were left out of the 
American public imagination, and why it may be worth putting them back into the story. 
American Vietnam War films broadly tell a story that begins in patriotism and 
ends in a debate between cynical skepticism versus a narrative of betrayal. One of the 
only films made during the war itself, John Wayne’s The Green Berets (1968) depicts an 
unabashed patriotism and pro-military stance that sought to garner public support of the 
 
220 Linda Dittmar and Gene Michaud, eds. From Hanoi to Hollywood: The Vietnam War in American Film 
(New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1990), Introduction, Kindle Edition Location 252. 
221 Ibid., Preface, Kindle Edition Location 283. 
222 Ibid., Appendix B, Kindle Location 5108. In a collection of 19 critical essays and an appendix including 
over 200 Vietnam War related films and documentaries, there is absolutely no mention of Korea or 
Koreans other than as a comparison of the Vietnam War to the Korean War or general facts regarding 
chronology of major events (e.g. The Pueblo incident). For this analysis, I personally watched ten of the 
most well-known U.S. films that depict the Vietnam War, and can attest that there is absolutely no 
acknowledgement of South Korean participation in any form. See bibliography for the full list. 
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war.223 After the war ended, movies struggled to reconcile America’s defeat, the 
senselessness of the destruction, and the struggles of returning veterans to assimilate back 
into society. Acclaimed films like The Deer Hunter (1978) and Apocalypse Now (1979) 
depict the war as an unspeakable tragedy and descent into psychotic madness that 
permanently destroyed the lives of surviving veterans.224 By the 1980’s, Vietnam movies 
approached a fork in the road. Some continued down a critical path of depicting a racist 
and imperialist U.S. with themes of human depravity that cast doubt on veterans’ ethical 
conduct (Platoon 1986, Full Metal Jacket 1987).225 The other road followed a 
conservative Reagan administration in recasting the war as a narrative of betrayal. 
Betrayed by the anti-war protest movement and a weak government that withdrew 
commitment from the cause, American GI’s were not allowed to win. This narrative is 
best depicted in the plight of American POW’s (The Hanoi Hilton 1987) and the hyper-
masculine Rambo franchise (Rambo: First Blood Part II 1985), where a neglected 
veteran redeems American masculinity by returning to Vietnam and freeing left-behind 
POW’s.226  
American films depict an ideological debate unfolding over four decades, and 
nowhere are Koreans present. Perhaps this should not be surprising, considering U.S. 
films frequently express racialized and ethnocentric depictions of a monolithic Asian 
 
223 The Green Berets. Directed by John Wayne and Ray Kellogg. Batjac Productions, 1968. 
224 The Deer Hunter. Directed by Michael Cimino. EMI, 1978. Apocalypse Now. Directed by Francis 
Coppola. Omni Zoetrope, 1979. 
225 Platoon. Directed by Oliver Stone. Hemdale Film Corporation, 1986. Full Metal Jacket. Directed by 
Stanley Kubrick. Natant Harrier Films, 1987. 
226 Rambo: First Blood Part II. Directed by George P. TriStar Pictures, 1985. The Hanoi Hilton. Directed 
by Lionel Chetwynd. Cannon Film Distributors, 1987.  
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enemy that leaves no room to distinguish a South Korean ally. Yet, the presence of 
Koreans could have helped either side of the debate, whether to add legitimacy to the war 
(a noble Korean ally joining a common cause) or adding to the cynicism of the conflict 
(Korean mercenaries present at the behest of an imperial U.S.). They have been left out of 
the story completely. Why is this, and how do Korean films compare? 
South Korean memory of the Vietnam War remained highly repressed compared 
to the U.S. with far fewer films, novels, or other renditions made available to the public. 
This repression is due to the censorship of information under the Park and Chun 
governments, combined with the shame of the potential mercenary narrative and the 
war’s failure.227 South Korean films depicting the war did not appear until the 1990’s, 
and they are few in number, suggesting it is not a popular topic for the Korean public. 
Yet, notable films exist that mirror the same themes in U.S. movies. Based on a 
previously censored novel by Vietnam veteran Ahn Junghyo, White Badge (1992) centers 
on a veteran and journalist in 1979 South Korea coping with PTSD and writing a novel 
about his experience, and the film portrays the ROK military in a questionable light.228 In 
contrast, the horror film R-Point (2004) portrays a rugged ROKA platoon full of 
machismo and military glitz that may appeal to a young male audience.229 Alternatively, 
Sunny (2008) tells a romanticized story of Soon-yi, a singer in a musical act that 
entertains soldiers, who travels to Vietnam to reunite with her husband.230 The romance, 
The Classic (2003), uses the Vietnam War to add to the male protagonists’ likeability, 
 
227 Kwak Tae Yang, 260. 
228 White Badge. Directed by Chung Ji-young. Chong Nam-gook, 1992. 
229 R-Point. Directed by Kong Su-chang. Cinema Service, 2004. 
230 Sunny. Directed by Lee Joon-ik. Jung Seung-hye, Cho Chul-hyun, 2008. 
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masculinity, and contributes to the romantic plot.231 More recently, Ode to my Father 
(2014), in many respects a parallel to Forest Gump (1994), includes the Vietnam War as 
a pivotal moment in the protagonist’s life, and by extension a key moment in the history 
of South Korea; it casts the ROKA in a sympathetic and favorable depiction.232 These 
South Korean films offer a fruitful analysis of shared themes: rationalizing their country’s 
purpose in Vietnam, questioning who the real enemy was, and understanding returning 
veterans’ PTSD and assimilation back to normal life.  
The first shared theme questions the conflict’s larger purpose as an utterly 
senseless tragedy and focuses on human depravity, most recognizably captured in Oliver 
Stone’s Platoon and Chung Ji-young’s White Badge. Platoon depicts the most negative 
aspects of the war imaginable: blatant violence towards civilians, overt racism, attempted 
rape, torching a village, illicit drug use, infighting amongst GI’s, intentional fratricide, 
and the abandonment of a U.S. soldier to die. The movie ends with no redeeming purpose 
to the struggle. White Badge depicts the ROK military experience in the same cynical 
nature. ROKA soldiers physically abuse Vietnamese civilians and torch their village. 
Later, when the unit mistakenly kills a group of Vietnamese civilians, a ROKA sergeant 
cuts of their ears and reports to his commander that they were Viet Cong. Afterwards, the 
same sergeant commits fratricide by killing the only ROK soldier who knows the truth 
(the same reasoning behind the fratricide in Platoon). The audience takes away a critical, 
at best ambivalent, view of soldiers’ conduct in both films. One side of the memory for 
 
231 The Classic. Directed by Kwak Jae-yong. Egg Films, 2003.  
232Ode to my Father. Directed by Yoon Je-kyoon. CJ Entertainment, 2014. 
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both countries remembers the war as a senseless and depraved struggle, leading both to 
regret and doubt their purpose in it. 
The questioning of purpose in Vietnam is linked to a second shared theme of 
distinguishing the protagonist from the antagonist. Films make the audience question, 
“Who was the real enemy in the Vietnam War?” Platoon’s final line ends with the main 
character’s reflection: “I think now, looking back, we did not fight the enemy. We fought 
ourselves. The enemy was in us.”  The comedic Good Morning Vietnam (1988) also ends 
with a disillusioned Adrian Cronauer doubting himself. In the climax, Cronauer confronts 
his Vietnamese best friend, (revealed to be a Viet Cong member) and screams: “I gave 
you my friendship and my trust, and now they tell me that my best friend is the god damn 
enemy!” Tuan responds: “Enemy? What is enemy?...You the enemy!”233 South Korean 
films express the same sentiment. White Badge’s main character Han, reflecting on his 
experience cynically thinks: “I didn’t defend Vietnam’s freedom or peace. I only 
defended my own pathetic life while getting more confused about human values and 
history.” In R-Point the ROKA platoon confronts the supernatural and results in killing 
each other, not Viet Cong. In an interview with the lead actor, Kam Woo-sung recalled 
“It’s [R-Point] not just a horror movie, it’s about the inner struggle” of soldiers.234 The 
nature of an ill-defined enemy constitutes a common thread in both U.S. and Korean 
popular memory and adds another cynical component that explains why both countries 
 
233 Good Morning Vietnam. Directed by Barry Levinson. Touchstone Pictures, Silver Screen Partners III, 
1988. 




may prefer to forget their experience. With so much negativity, is there any reason worth 
remembering? 
Negative interpretations are juxtaposed with more traditional, honorific films that 
focus on celebrating veterans’ sacrifice for its own sake. This is best seen through the 
American We Were Soldiers (2002). Based on a memoir, the movie centers on Lieutenant 
Colonel Hal Moore valiantly leading his unit against overwhelming odds, fighting a 
clearly defined enemy, and through epic combat scenes achieves a victory at great human 
cost. The film ends with Moore visiting the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington D.C. 
and rolls the names of the 7th CAV’s casualty list in the credits. The audience’s takeaway 
is one of patriotic sacrifice, that the veterans must be remembered for their contribution 
to America.235 Korean films show the same theme. Both Sunny and The Classic depict 
patriotic send-off ceremonies for the ROKA soldiers, complete with civilians waving 
national flags and cheering. Unlike White Badge, these films depict the ROKA in 
conventional military action, heroically facing a well-defined enemy in more stereo-
typical combat scenes that create empathy for the soldiers’ service. These films are full of 
national pride that suggest a country’s desire to honor its veterans, a topic leading to yet 
another shared theme. 
Vietnam veterans’ homecoming and struggles with post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) is another highly visible shared memory. PTSD is central to the plot of White 
Badge. Han attempts to write a novel about the war but finds himself utterly unable to 
come to grips with his experience. An old army buddy, Private Byeon, also suffering 
from PTSD, reaches out to Han for desperate emotional support. White Badge gives a 
 
235 We Were Soldiers. Directed by Randall Wallace. Icon Productions, Wheelhouse Entertainment, 2002. 
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direct nod to an American film when Byeon walks by a movie poster for The Deer 
Hunter, a U.S. film with parallel themes. Both The Deer Hunter and White Badge follow 
plot-lines where characters’ relationships, jobs, and entire lives are completely ruined by 
their PTSD. Ultimately, The Deer Hunter tragically ends with a main character, still in 
Saigon, committing suicide via Russian roulette, while White Badge ends with Han 
mercifully killing Byeon in broad daylight (Byeon suffers a mental breakdown in public). 
White Badge’s final line is quite haunting, as Han thinks to himself: “He [Byeon] is still 
wondering in the jungle. I can’t leave him wondering around anymore.” Both films depict 
a gritty realism of veterans’ lived experience and their inability to return to a normal life. 
They also empathetically express to the audience that society, American and Korean, may 
have an obligation to help these veterans and to remember what they went through. 
While both U.S. and ROK films have shared themes, the mercenary narrative is 
an extra piece of baggage that the ROK alone struggles to reconcile. Unlike the American 
debate that obsesses over betrayal and “winning” or “losing” the war, the sticking point 
in Korean films is financial compensation. The combination of the financial motivations 
and benefits to Korea with that of the lived experience of war is an unresolved moral 
dilemma. White Badge has a scene where a Korean calls out a businessman, “Frankly you 
got rich thanks to the Vietnam War. While he [Han] was risking his life your family got 
rich on military supplies.” The businessman replies, “What’s wrong with that? We made 
money thanks to President Park. When President Park died, my Dad cried. I will splurge 
this dirty money.” Lines in White Badge like “dirty money” and “came home as a 
mercenary” reflect this dilemma that Han’s military service served no greater purpose 
than to enrich wealthy businessmen. In Sunny, the rock band expresses their motivation in 
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going to Vietnam purely to gain fortune and fame while entertaining soldiers. “Soldiers 
kill Viet Cong and we make money,” says one band member upon arrival. At one point, 
Viet Cong capture the band. Bandleader Kim Jeong-man asks his translator: “What is he 
[the Viet Cong leader] saying? Tell him we are here to make money.” Kim believes the 
distinction between entertainers making money, versus that of military personnel, will 
save him. The VC responds: “Korean Army has come to make money too.” By the end of 
Sunny, the band achieves their financial goal but decides to burn the money and focuses 
on a more noble goal instead (finding Soon-yi’s husband), thus ending the film with a 
more respectable motivation other than money. Sunny and White Badge directly 
acknowledge the mercenary narrative that challenges South Korea’s national interest as 
nothing more than financial profiteering. The mercenary label damages South Korean 
national pride and makes the Vietnam War a shameful memory.  
In addition to the mercenary narrative, Korean films also depict an awareness and 
resentment of American racism towards Asians, another sticking point in the shared 
memory. While Americans do not depict Koreans in their films, the Koreans often 
portray Americans negatively. In R-Point, ROKA soldiers refer to Americans as “Yankee 
assholes”; there is certainly no love lost between these allies. Ode to my Father depicts a 
Korean excited about entering a bar (possibly a brothel) in Vietnam, but the main 
character doubts that Americans would let him inside, possibly because of his race. In 
Sunny, U.S. soldiers first rescue Soon-yi and her band from the VC, but then almost kill 
the band, despite exclamations of “I’m Korean!” The scene signals to the audience that 
American GI’s cannot tell the difference between Vietnamese and Koreans. Furthermore, 
when Soon-yi performs in front of American troops, the GI’s demean her through sexual 
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objectification, treating her like a stripper. Comparatively, Soon-yi’s performances are 
still sexually provocative when done in front of ROKA troops; however, these scenes are 
jovial celebrations that feature traditional Korean songs. This further suggest a racial 
element in that it is acceptable for Soon-yi to be sexualized in front of Koreans but 
unacceptable in front of Americans, whose intentions are portrayed maliciously.236  
Could ethnocentrism and racism alone explain why Americans do not remember 
Korea’s role in Vietnam?  Broadly speaking, American racism towards Asians during the 
period is a well-known and studied theme, characterized by the harshly derogatory “gook 
syndrome.”237 Yet, racism alone is unlikely to explain the absence. American films 
certainly do not shy away from depicting racism towards the Vietnamese. Racism is 
readily on display in most U.S. films such as Platoon, Full Metal Jacket, and Good 
Morning Vietnam, always directed towards dehumanizing Vietnamese, and forces 
audiences to confront the uncomfortable reality of the period.  
Additionally, even in movies that strive to avoid racist depictions, Koreans are 
still absent. In We Were Soldiers, LTC Moore addresses his unit, saying: “Look around 
you, in the 7th Cavalry, we got a Captain from Ukraine, another from Puerto Rico. We got 
Japanese, Chinese, Blacks, Hispanics, Cherokee Indians, Jews, Gentiles, all American.” 
In Moore’s speech of racial and ethnic solidarity, South Korean allies did not make the 
cut. Perhaps there were no Koreans in the 7th CAV, or Moore was unaware of the 
 
236 Soon-yi’s performances are more explicitly sexual in front of American audiences, and Soon-yi is 
visibly uncomfortable singing American songs like “Suzy-Q.” Although the sexual element is still present, 
she is seen totally at ease in front of Korean audiences when singing Korean folk songs in scenes that take 
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take on the atmosphere of a strip club with dark, indoor settings.  
237 Simeon Man, Soldiering Through Empire: Race and the Making of the Decolonizing Pacific (Oakland: 
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ROKA’s presence in Vietnam in 1965. Yet, We Were Soldiers does make two references 
to Korea in the film; the fact that LTC Moore was a Korean War Veteran himself, and a 
quick aside where Moore complains to a superior about the larger geo-political situation: 
“Korea didn’t teach them [U.S. politicians] anything.” These references indicate Moore 
was likely aware of Korea’s relevance to U.S. Cold War politics; yet ROKA soldiers in 
Vietnam are never mentioned. While racism is no doubt an added component to the 
conflict over Vietnam’s memory, the fact that a film went out of its way to avoid racist 
depictions, but still did not mention Koreans, suggests the lapse in memory is deeper still. 
Returning to the main question, why doesn’t U.S. public memory recall Koreans 
in Vietnam and why does it matter? Certainly, the mercenary narrative, racism, and 
commercial interests of the film industry are possible explanations. However, I propose 
the root answer may be the question of national interests, a topic that neither U.S. nor 
ROK films confront. U.S. Vietnam War films are consistently portrayals from the bottom 
up, centering on individual experiences as observers to larger geo-political events well 
beyond one’s knowledge or control.  The core question of “Why are we in Vietnam?” is 
not debated and is quickly passed off to an impersonal government’s machinations.238 In 
one scholar’s words, the war was just “something that happened, rather than something 
that was done.”239 The top-down approach is not present. American films are afraid to 
seriously address the question “Why are we in Vietnam?” because the answer is too 
frightening, damaging, and divisive to the American public. Afraid to answer this 
 
238 In both The Green Berets and The Hanoi Hilton military officers directly answer this question (when 
asked by reporters) by referring them to the civilian authorities. The military is portrayed as acting out 
lawful orders without questioning their purpose.  
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question, Americans cannot possibly add another wrinkle of “Why are Koreans in 
Vietnam with us?” ROK national interests are another matter entirely, perhaps even more 
confounding for the American public to contemplate.  
An analytical comparison of U.S. and Korean film representations of the Vietnam 
War must conclude the two countries shared an experience, evidenced by so many of the 
same shared themes and ideological debates. Ultimately, including Koreans in the 
Vietnam War story is a matter of setting the record straight. They were there, and they 
contributed considerably. This is a continuation of America’s shared history with South 
Korea going back to 1945 and needs to be acknowledged. The Vietnam War, for all its 
faults and turbulence, was an important steppingstone on the ROK’s journey towards 
becoming a world power. The U.S. was integral to the process by bringing the ROK to 
war with them, and therefore shares degrees of both blame and credit for the impacts on 






The mercenary narrative is an oversimplification of the ROK’s participation in 
Vietnam and masks a larger story of national interests. South Korea did not join the war 
purely out of U.S. pressure. Park Chung Hee, as part of his national vision for the 
country’s future, seized an opportunity to increase his own political stability, national 
defense, and economic development. South Korea had a national interest in prosecuting 
the Vietnam War as it was linked to their own military conflict against a belligerent 
North Korea. The South Korean military, despite controversy, made a sizable qualitative 
and quantitative contribution to the U.S. effort in Vietnam, one far beyond a token 
presence. Due to the tumultuous aftermath of the war and the staying presence of the 
mercenary narrative, the memory of the ROK’s participation in Vietnam has been left in 
the dust bin of history.  
Reclaiming this memory is important to American and South Korean history for 
three major reasons. First, restoring the memory is vital to honoring the sacrifice of U.S. 
and ROK veterans for its own sake. Secondly, the Vietnam War is crucial to 
understanding the ROK’s economic ascent, one which the U.S. facilitated by legitimizing 
Park and came at a human cost. Lastly, the partnership demonstrated that military 
alliances hinge on the degree of shared national interests between governments, a topic of 
vital relevance to today’s geo-politics. 
To the first point, appreciating the ROK soldiers’ sacrifice in Vietnam is a worthy 
cause in itself that benefits contemporary U.S./ROK relations. The current ROK 
ambassador to the U.S., Soo Hyuck Lee, stated the alliance between the two countries is 
“deeply embedded” through an “alliance bought in blood,” referring to the Korean War. 
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He elaborated further with the metaphor of the U.S./ROK alliance as a tree, with the 
military as the tree’s roots, economic cooperation as the branches, and cultural elements 
as the flowers and leaves.240 Vietnam was a continuation of this partnership. Yet the 
ROK veterans have been shortchanged by both U.S. memory and ROKG actions. Due to 
ROKG censorship and concerns over public appearances, ROK veterans have suffered 
several injustices. These included an initial exclusion from the Agent Orange class action 
settlement (at ROKG’s insistence), a refusal to accept soldiers’ remains from the 
Vietnamese government (ROKG insisted there were none), and a continuing debate over 
the exact casualty, MIA, and POW figures.241  
At least one example of honoring ROK veterans can be found in the U.S. The 
Korean American Veterans of the Vietnam War (KAVV) is specifically dedicated to this 
purpose. The organization recognizes Korean Americans (serving in the U.S. armed 
forces) combined with that of ROK soldiers who fought in Vietnam, some of whom are 
now U.S. citizens. According to KAVV, about 3,000 Korean veterans of Vietnam reside 
in the U.S. today. The organization’s current mission is to assist aging veterans and their 
widows gain access to quality care and assistance to gain U.S. citizenship and voting 
rights. The organization proudly declares that Korean veterans “supported the cause of 
freedom at the request of the United States.” 242 Unsurprisingly, the word “mercenary” is 
nowhere found on their website, nor any mention of economic benefits to the ROK. Here 
is a case of Korean veterans honoring their service with appeals to patriotism. 
 
240 Soo Hyuck Lee, "Korea Policy Forum with Ambassador Soo Hyuck Lee", presentation for the George 
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When it comes to comrades in arms, political motivations matter little when lives 
are in danger. The mercenary narrative may be appealing to critics seeking to question 
the USG or ROKG’s politics, but the label loses rhetorical power when applied to ROK 
soldiers on an individual level. Even Robert Blackburn, himself a Vietnam veteran, while 
still denouncing “More Flags” as hiring mercenaries, placed this heartfelt afterword to his 
monograph: 
During almost two years of duty in Vietnam, this author had the good fortune to 
fight alongside, though never with, some units of the ROK Marines, and was 
never bothered by what label they wore. For mercenaries or no, these men, and 
their Filipino and Thai counterparts, shared the same dangers, the same hardships, 
and the same fears as any American there. These Korean, Filipino, and Thai 
soldiers were simply brave soldiers serving their country because their country’s 
leaders said they had to, and 5,241 of them died following these orders. There is 
no rancor nor reproach felt here toward the honorable services of these brave 
men.243 
  
U.S. and ROK soldiers may not have always been physically shoulder to shoulder, but 
they were both in the same country fighting for the same side. They were both there, 
fighting together. The shared experience matters. 
 Secondly, the Vietnam War had a dramatic impact on the ROK’s history, and the 
USG may not have been fully cognizant of its role in facilitating the change. By the end 
of the war, South Korea overtook North Korea economically and militarily for the first 
time. The ROK transitioned from an impoverished agrarian nation, dependent on U.S. 
handouts, into a rising power on the world stage, fully integrated into the U.S. Military 
Industrial Complex and no longer in need of financial aid. Chaebols like Hanjin and 
Hyundai that benefited so tremendously from the business of war are still the heavy-
weight titans of South Korean industry today. Combined with these positive impacts, 
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there was also the “dark side” of Park’s authoritarianism, human rights abuses, and labor 
exploitation, all of which the U.S. implicitly facilitated through supporting Park.  
Park’s actions set South Korea on a trajectory of continuing militarization and 
statism for two decades. Even after Park’s assassination, Chun Do Hwan, a regimental 
commander in the Vietnam War, continued the legacy of a military dictator. He seized 
power in a coup just as Park did, and continued highly controversial and authoritarian 
policies, most famously at the 1980 “Kwangju Massacre” where ROK soldiers killed 
hundreds of South Korean civilians protesting Chun’s coup.244 To the resentment of the 
ROK public and political opposition, the U.S. again took a “wait and see approach,” just 
as they had with Park, and accepted and legitimized Chun.  
How aware was the U.S. of this dark side of these domestic impacts? From the 
USG standpoint, it likely mattered little as long as the ROK offset North Korea and 
fulfilled its Cold War purpose. Concerning U.S. relations with South Korea, Bruce 
Cumings critically commented: “This people [South Korea] deserves better from its own 
leadership, and it deserves better than it has gotten from the United States that has been 
deeply involved in the lives of Koreans for half a century, but knows them not.”245 
Understanding how the U.S. war effort in Vietnam dramatically affected South Korea is 
necessary for the U.S. to acknowledge its role in South Korea’s trajectory, both the good 
and the bad.  
Lastly, South Korea’s contribution to Vietnam was a significant case study for the 
utilization of alliances in the modern world. Contemporary U.S. military alliances often 
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devolve into the derided “coalition of the willing,” full of token and tentative presences 
that make little to no military impact. 246 The ROKA in Vietnam was just the opposite. It 
is doubtful that foreign observers expected the ROK to be capable of deploying a Corps 
sized element, 50,000 soldiers, outside of its own borders, but they did. ROKFV’s 
presence was militarily significant, earned the praise and accolades of the highest-ranking 
U.S. commanders, and proved the ROK as a potent and capable military power.  
The ROK’s military capability is highly relevant to contemporary geo-politics in a 
changing world. North Korea remains a top adversary of both the U.S. and ROK. The 
U.S. and China’s strategic rivalry poses considerable uncertainties to the world’s future. 
In facing these strategic challenges, the ROK remains a vital and essential partner to the 
U.S., one that should never be taken for granted. The military alliance between the U.S. 
and the South Korea now spans seven decades and multiple wars, continuing into the 
present. South Korea supplied the second the greatest number of allied troops to the Iraq 
War to aid their ally once again.  
The U.S./ROK partnership during Vietnam demonstrated that military alliances 
are based on shared national interests, more so than mutual values. In future conflicts, the 
U.S. will need allies again. The USG must remember that the extent of meaningful allied 
contributions is linked to the degree to which their national interests align. In the case of 
the Vietnam War, the ROKG’s national interests – political, national defense, economic - 
 
246 “Coalition of the Willing” refers to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 which struggled to maintain 
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aligned in such a way that the Republic of Korea willingly became an effective American 
ally, even in what proved to be a losing cause. For better or worse, the Vietnam War was 







U.S. Allied Troop Contributions to the Vietnam War 
Country Peak Number Troop 
Contribution 
South Korea 50,003 
Thailand 11,586 
Australia 7,672 
The Philippines 2,061 
New Zealand 552 
   247 
Appendix B 
South Korean Deployments to Vietnam 
Date Deployment 
September 1964 First Mobile Surgical Hospital (MASH) 
and Taekwondo Instructors 
March 1965 Dove Corps – Engineering Brigade and 
Logistical Support 
October 1965 First Combat Deployment – Capital 
Division (Tiger Corps), Second Marine 
Regiment (Blue Dragon Corps) 
September 1966 Second Combat Deployment -Capital 
Division (26th, 28th, 29th, 13th Regiments) 
and Ninth Division (White Horse) 
August 1967 Additional Marine Brigade 
Planned for 1968 Cancelled by the ROKG 
248 
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The “Brown Memorandum” – U.S. Concessions for the Second ROK Combat 
Deployment 
1 Equip/Finance all additional costs of additional ROK forces deployed to RVN 
2 Pay Overseas Allowances to all new forces (30 times the rate ROK forces in Korea 
receive, and four times that of RVN troops) 
3 Death, wounded, and disability gratuities at double the rate originally agreed upon 
4 Equip, train, finance complete replacement of the additional forces deployed to RVN 
5 Provide communications facilities for exclusive ROK use; provide 4 C-54 aircraft to 
ROKAF 
6 Provide over the next few years substantial…modernization of ROK forces in Korea 
7 Provide improvement of ROK barracks and sanitation facilities 
8 Provide improvement to ROK anti-infiltration capability, following completion of joint 
study 
9 Provide equipment to expand ROK arsenal for increased ammunition production 
10 Avoid new economic burdens for Korea, release additional won to the Korean budget 
equal to all of the net costs of the deployment… 
11 Suspend MAP Transfer Program as long as there are ROK forces (2 divisions) in 
RVN…review Off-shore procurement in Korea with a further determination in FY68 
12 Procure in Korea supplies, services, equipment for ROK forces in RVN and to direct to 
Korea selected types of procurement for U.S. and RVN forces… 
13 Procure in Korea…as much as Korea can provide in time and at a reasonable price, a 
substantial amount of goods being purchased by AID for use in its project program for 
rural construction, pacification, relief, logistics, and so forth, in RVN 
14 Provide Korean contractors expanded opportunities to participate in construction projects 
in RVN 
15 Increase technical assistance to ROK in general field of export promotion 
16 Provide AID loans over and above the $150 million figure agreed in May 1965 
17 Provide $15 million of program loans in 1966 which can be used for exports to RVN 
       249 
  
 
249 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, Washington, January 27, 1966, FRUS 





Primary Sources:  
Archival 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, Korea, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1. 
 
______Korea, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 1. 
 
______ Southeast Asia, 1969-1972, Volume XX. 
 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, https://www.discoverlbj.org/. 
 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). https://www.archives.gov/. 
  
______Film Reel – ROK ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM (TIGER INFANTRY 
DIVISION), Motion Picture Films from the Army Library Copy Collection, 1964 
– 1980, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 – 1985, RG 111, 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/33145 (accessed October 1, 2020). 
 
______ROKFV-FID CMD G-3 Report, Combined Campaign Plan 3rd Quarterly Review, 
found in File Unit: 201-29 Helicopters in Psyop, 1969, General Records, 1969-
1972, RG 472, Records of the U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia, 1950-1976, NARA. 
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/74207857 (accessed October 7, 2020). 
 
______1619-02 Ninh An Village Project, 1970, General Records, 1969-1972, RG 472, 
Records of the U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia, 1950-1976, NARA. 
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/74216066 (accessed October 8, 2020). 
 







The Wilson Center Digital Archive, International History Declassified. History and 










Other Primary Sources: 
 
Korean American Veterans of the Vietnam War, https://www.kavvw.org/. 
 
Lee, Soo Hyuck. "Korea Policy Forum with Ambassador Soo Hyuck Lee." Presentation 
for the George Washington University Institute for Korean Studies, September 3, 
2020. 
 
Lieutenant General Stanley Robert Larsen and Brigadier General James Lawton Collins 
Jr. Vietnam Studies: Allied Participation in Vietnam. Washington D.C., 
Department of the Army, CMH Pub 90-5-1, 2005, first printed 1975. 
 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 





Rasmussen, Ronald R. “ROK Operations in Central Vietnam.” Military Review XLVIII, 
no. 1 (January 1968): 51-55. 
 
U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-16, “The Army in Multinational Operations.” 
Washington D.C., Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014. 
 
Films: U.S 
The Green Berets. Directed by John Wayne and Ray Kellogg. Batjac Productions, 1968. 
The Deer Hunter. Directed by Michael Cimino. EMI, 1978. 
Apocalypse Now. Directed by Francis Coppola. Omni Zoetrope, 1979. 
Rambo: First Blood Part II. Directed by George P.Cosmatos. TriStar Pictures, 1985.  
Platoon. Directed by Oliver Stone. Hemdale Film Corporation, 1986. 
Full Metal Jacket. Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Natant Harrier Films, 1987. 
The Hanoi Hilton. Directed by Lionel Chetwynd. Cannon Film Distributors, 1987. 
Good Morning Vietnam. Directed by Barry Levinson. Touchstone Pictures, Silver Screen  
Partners III, 1988. 
Forest Gump. Directed by Robert Zemeckis. The Tisch Company, 1994. 
We Were Soldiers. Directed by Randall Wallace. Icon Productions, Wheelhouse  
Entertainment, 2002. 
Films: South Korean 
White Badge. Directed by Chung Ji-young. Chong Nam-gook, 1992. 
The Classic. Directed by Kwak Jae-yong. Egg Films, 2003. 
R-Point. Directed by Kong Su-chang. Cinema Service, 2004. 
Sunny. Directed by Lee Joon-ik. Jung Seung-hye, Cho Chul-hyun, 2008. 






Baek, Glenn. “A Perspective on Korea’s Participation in the Vietnam War,” Asan 
Institute for Policy Studies, no. 53 (April 2013): 1-7. 
 
Blackburn, Robert M. Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson’s “More Flags”: The Hiring of 
Korean, Filipino, and Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War. Jefferson: McFarland & 
Company Inc., 1994. 
 
Brazinsky, Gregg. Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making 
of Democracy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 
 
Chung, Patrick, “From Korea to Vietnam: Local Labor, Multinational Capital, and the 
Evolution of US Military Logistics, 1950-97,” Radical History Review, issue 133 
(January 2019): 31-46. 
 
Cumings, Bruce. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. New York and London: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 2005, 1997). 
 
______ Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American East Asian Relations. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2002. 
 
Dittmar, Linda and Gene Michaud, eds. From Hanoi to Hollywood: The Vietnam War in  
American Film. New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1990. 
 
Eckert, Carter J. Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism 1866-
1945. Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2016. 
 
Ekbladh, David. The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an  
American World Order. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
 
Eun, Seo Jo. “Fighting for Peanuts: Reimaging South Korean Soldiers’ Participation in 
the Wollam Boom,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations vol. 21,  no. 1 
(2014): 58-87. 
 
Fallah, Katherine. “Corporate Actors: The Legal Status of Mercenaries in Armed 
Conflict.” International Review of the Red Cross 88, no. 863 (September 2006): 
604. 
 
Fuchs Eckhardt, Tokushi Kasahara, and Sven Saaler eds. A New Modern History of East 
Asia Vol. 1. Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2018. 
 
Glassman, Jim. Drums of War, Drums of Development: The Formation of a Pacific 
Ruling Class and Industrial Transformation in East and Southeast Asia, 1945-




Gurtov, Mel, James Larson, and Robert Swartout Jr. Korea’s Amazing Century: From 
Kings to Satellites. Edited by Ray Weisenborn. Seoul: Korea Fulbright 
Foundation and Korean-American Educational Commission, 1996. 
 
Hernández, Charles M. Mercenaries in the Vietnam War: Washington’s Hiring of South 
Korean Soldiers. Self-published: 2020. 
 
Kim, Byung-Kook and Ezra F. Vogel, eds. The Park Chung Hee Era: The 
Transformation of South Korea. Cambridge and London: Harvard University 
Press, 2011. 
 
Kwak Tae Yang. “The Anvil of War: The Legacies of Korean Participation in the 
Vietnam War.” PhD diss., Harvard University, 2006. 
 
Lerner, Mitchell B. The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American 
Foreign Policy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. 
 
______ “The Second Korean War.” Essay for the Modern Korean History Portal, Wilson 
Center History and Public Policy Program. Undated. 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/resource/modern-korean-history-portal/the-
second-korean-war/summary (accessed January 18, 2021).  
 
Lie, John. Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998. 
 
Liscano, Michael H. Jr. “Multinational Force Integration: The ROK Army’s Integration 
with the US Army in the Vietnam War.” Monograph from School of Advanced 
Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. 
Leavenworth KS, 2016. 
 
Logevall, Fredrik. Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War 
in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
 
Man, Simeon. Soldiering Through Empire: Race and the Making of the Decolonizing 
Pacific. Oakland: University of California Press, 2018. 
 
Moon, Katharine H. S. Protesting America: Democracy and the U.S.-Korea Alliance. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2012. 
 
______Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997. 
 
Oberdorfer, Don, and Robert Carlin. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. New 




Park, Tae Gyun. An Ally and Empire: Two Myths of South Korea-United States Relations, 
1945-1980. Gyeonggi-do: The Academy of Korean Studies Press, 2012. 
 
Sang, Hwa Hong. 30/50 Club: A Dialogue on S. Korea, U.S., China, and N. Korea (For 
Truth, Empathy, and Future Harmony!). Korean Literature Inc. 2019. 
 
Sargent, Daniel J. A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign 
Relations in the 1970’s. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
 
 
